Many retailers offer price-matching guarantees (PMGs) whereby they promise their customers that any lower price offered by competition for an identical product will be matched. Suppliers sometimes also offer PMGs to consumers in their direct channels. However, the extant literature on PMGs focuses on retailers and is silent on the role of upper stream chain members. We contribute to the literature by identifying the implications of PMGs in a dual distribution channel in which a supplier reaches consumers via a direct channel in addition to the retail channel. We show that the presence of PMGs in a dual channel hinges on supplier’s strategic ability, or lack thereof, to adjust its wholesale price in relation to the guarantee. Specifically, a PMG fails to prevail at equilibrium when the supplier is capable of strategically adjusting its wholesale price - but may prevail at equilibrium otherwise. The main reason is that the supplier can manage the competition between the retail channel and the direct channel through its wholesale price decision, and offering a PMG limits this ability. On the other hand, offering a PMG can be a beneficial strategy for the supplier when the supplier cannot adjust its wholesale price; for instance in a retail dominant chain where the retailer dictates the transfer price. In a retail dominant chain, if the direct and retail channels are perceived to be similar in quality and service offerings, then both channel members benefit from offering a PMG because it softens the intensity of price competition. On the other hand, when the two channels are sufficiently differentiated in quality and service offerings, then retail managers should be cautious and avoid offering the guarantee if their channel is in a superior position in terms of perceived quality.

中文翻译：

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双通道价格匹配保证

许多零售商提供价格匹配保证（PMG），借此向客户保证，竞争对手为同一产品提供的任何较低价格都将得到匹配。供应商有时还会通过其直接渠道向消费者提供PMG。但是，有关PMG的现有文献主要针对零售商，而没有提及上游链成员的作用。我们通过识别双重分销渠道中PMG的含义为文献做出了贡献，在双重分销渠道中，供应商通过零售渠道之外的直接渠道与消费者接触。我们表明，双渠道中PMG的存在取决于供应商的战略能力（或缺乏战略能力），以调整其相对于担保的批发价格。特别，当供应商能够从战略上调整其批发价格时，PMG不能在平衡时占优势-但在其他情况下可以平衡时占优势。主要原因是供应商可以管理零售渠道和直接渠道之间通过其批发价格决定进行竞争，并提供PMG限制了此功能。另一方面，当供应商无法调整批发价格时，提供PMG对供应商可能是有益的策略。例如，在零售主导链中，零售商决定转让价格。在零售主导链中，如果认为直接渠道和零售渠道在质量和服务产品上相似，那么这两个渠道成员都会从提供PMG中受益，因为它可以减轻价格竞争的强度。另一方面，当两个渠道在质量和服务产品上有足够的差异时，则零售经理应谨慎，如果他们的渠道在感知质量上处于优势地位，则应避免提供保证。