Consumers are often uncertain about their product valuation before purchase. They may bear the uncertainty and purchase the product without deliberation. Alternatively, consumers can incur a deliberation cost to find out their true valuation and then make their purchase decision. This paper proposes that consumer deliberation about product valuation can be an endogenous mechanism to enable credible quality signaling. We demonstrate this point in a simple setup in which product quality influences the probability that the product has high valuation. We show that with endogenous deliberation there may exist a unique separating equilibrium in which the high-quality firm induces consumer deliberation by setting a high price whereas the low-quality firm prevents deliberation by charging a low price. Compared to the case of complete information, the price of the high-quality firm can be distorted upward to facilitate consumer deliberation, or distorted downward to avoid the low-quality firm’s imitation. In an extension we show that dissipative advertising can facilitate quality signaling. The high-quality firm can utilize advertising spending to avert imitation from the low-quality firm without distorting price downward, earning a higher profit than that without advertising. However, advertising mitigates the distortion at the expense of consumer surplus and social welfare.

中文翻译：

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消费者商议和质量信号

消费者通常不确定购买前的产品价值。他们可能会承受不确定性，并会不加考虑地购买产品。替代地，消费者可以招致沉思成本以找出他们的真实估值，然后做出购买决定。本文提出，消费者对产品评估的审议可以是实现可靠质量信号的内生机制。我们通过一个简单的设置来证明这一点，在该设置中，产品质量会影响产品具有较高估值的可能性。我们表明，利用内生的协商，可能存在一个独特的分离均衡，在这种均衡中，高质量的公司通过设定高价来诱导消费者的协商，而劣质的公司通过收取低价来防止协商。与完整信息的情况相比，高品质公司的价格可以向上扭曲以利于消费者的考虑，也可以向下扭曲以避免低质量公司的模仿。在扩展中，我们表明，耗散广告可以促进质量信号传递。高品质的公司可以利用广告支出避免低品质公司的模仿，而不会导致价格下降，从而比没有广告的公司获得更高的利润。但是，广告可以减轻这种扭曲，但会损害消费者剩余和社会福利。高品质的公司可以利用广告支出避免低品质公司的模仿，而不会导致价格下降，从而比没有广告的公司获得更高的利润。但是，广告可以减轻这种扭曲，但会损害消费者剩余和社会福利。高品质的公司可以利用广告支出避免低品质公司的模仿，而不会导致价格下降，从而比没有广告的公司获得更高的利润。但是，广告可以减轻这种扭曲，但会损害消费者剩余和社会福利。