Does the targeted spending of public resources provide electoral benefits for incumbents? Despite the attention of scholars to that question, the empirical results are mixed thus far. The present paper supplies insights into the electoral benefits of discretionary funding on local elections. I study the consequences of pork-barrel politics in 7355 competitive mayoral elections in Slovakia between 2006 and 2018, finding that more grants from the central government enhance the likelihood of mayors winning reelection. The same advantage applies to mayors whose municipalities receive grants in local election years. The effects of the number of grants obtained as well as the timing of their distribution are, however, moderated by municipal population. More specifically, a larger number of grants and resources obtained near the end of the mayoral term provides electoral benefits only to small town mayors but give no advantage to the mayors of larger urban areas.

公共资源的有针对性的支出是否为现任者提供了选举利益？尽管学者们关注这个问题，但迄今为止的实证结果喜忧参半。本文提供了有关地方选举可自由支配资金的选举利益的见解。我研究了 2006 年至 2018 年斯洛伐克 7355 次竞争性市长选举中猪肉桶政治的后果，发现来自中央政府的更多拨款提高了市长赢得连任的可能性。同样的优势适用于市政当局在地方选举年获得补助金的市长。然而，获得的补助金数量及其分配时间的影响受到市政人口的影响。进一步来说，