ABSTRACT

This paper analyzes the process of renegotiation of the informal contract between the regional and federal elites of Russia after the economic crisis. We use the database of Center of Public Procedures’ “Business against Corruption” to show that, after 2011, regional elites in Russia lost the pre-existing opportunity to extract rents from businesses in return for favorable election results for Vladimir Putin and United Russia. We also analyze the connection between the level of corporate raiding in various Russian regions and the political competition, tenure, and ties of their governors. We show that there are two distinct models for fighting raiding in a region: an authoritarian model for suppressing negative signals and a competitive model with the creation of a new consensus among the elites. Although both models are similar in terms of the absence of negative signals, they have very different consequences in the business context of an area.

摘要

本文分析了经济危机后俄罗斯区域与联邦精英之间非正式合同的重新谈判过程。我们使用公共程序中心的“反腐败企业”数据库显示，2011年之后，俄罗斯的区域精英失去了先前从企业那里提取租金的机会，以换取普京和俄罗斯联合大选的有利结果。我们还分析了俄罗斯各个地区的公司突袭程度与政治竞争，任期以及其行长之间的联系。我们证明了在一个地区有两种截然不同的战斗模式：一种是消极信号的威权主义模式，另一种是在精英之间建立新共识的竞争性模式。