We investigate the impact the degree of similarity between one’s decision environment and that of a referent peer has on budgetary reporting. Self-categorization theory suggests that greater environmental similarity leads individuals to adjust their behavior to adhere to the social norms of peers within the same environment. We look at a reporting environment where managers can observe environmental similarity but cannot observe peers’ behavior (e.g., managers do not communicate their budget reports between departments). In this setting, we find that managers facing a similar decision environment to that of a peer manager report higher budgets than managers facing a dissimilar decision environment. Further, consistent with the idea that managers base their perceptions about the group’s social norms on their own desired behavior when peer behavior is unobservable, we find evidence that managers predict peers to report as they would, given similar environmental circumstances. Our findings provide a valuable insight into how peer environments, without knowledge of peer actions, can subtly affect managerial behavior.

我们调查一个人的决策环境与参照对象的决策环境之间的相似度对预算报告的影响。自分类理论表明，更大的环境相似性会导致个人调整其行为，以遵守同一环境中同伴的社会规范。我们在一个报告环境中，管理者可以观察到环境的相似性但不能观察同伴的行为（例如，经理们不在部门之间传达他们的预算报告）。在这种情况下，我们发现面临与决策者类似的决策环境的经理所报告的预算要高于面临不同决策环境的管理者的预算。此外，与这样的观点一致，即当同事的行为不可观察时，管理者会根据自己期望的行为来理解他们对群体的社会规范，我们发现有证据表明，在类似的环境条件下，经理会预测同事会按照自己的意愿进行举报。我们的发现提供了宝贵的见解，可帮助您了解对等环境如何在不了解对等行为的情况下如何巧妙地影响管理行为。