This paper experimentally investigates two control mechanisms that firms can use to avoid negotiation conflicts in negotiated transfer pricing decisions: leadership tone and performance evaluation schemes. When division managers are evaluated using a competitive performance evaluation scheme, a supportive leadership tone leads to a higher likelihood that divisions will settle on a transfer price close to the equal-profit transfer price. In contrast, when division managers are evaluated using a cooperative performance evaluation scheme, leadership tone does not significantly affect the likelihood that divisions settle on an equal-profit transfer price. These results demonstrate that firms, maintaining individual performance evaluations in a decentralized company structure, can use an informal control such as leadership tone to manage negotiation conflicts.

本文通过实验研究了企业可以用来避免在协商的转让定价决策中发生协商冲突的两种控制机制：领导基调和绩效评估方案。当使用竞争绩效评估方案对部门经理进行评估时，支持性领导基调会导致部门更有可能以接近于等额利润转移价格的转移价格结算。相反，当使用合作绩效评估方案对部门经理进行评估时，领导基调不会显着影响部门以等额利润转移价格结算的可能性。这些结果表明，在分散的公司结构中维护个人绩效评估的公司，