Firms typically use a ‘one-size-fits-all’ (OSFA) compensation contract that specifies a common formulaic relation between performance and compensation (i.e., a performance bonus) for non-executive managers in similar jobs. However, a contract that is appropriate on average, may be suboptimal for individual managers if heterogeneity in the operating environment creates varying compensation risk. We use field data from a retail firm that introduced an OSFA bonus compensation plan for its store managers. The common bonus formula is based on a weighted sum of objective measures of performance and a subjective rating made by supervisors. The firm intended the supervisors’ discretionary subjective rating to evaluate performance on dimensions that are difficult to measure (e.g., store appearance). We test and find that supervisors give uniformly higher subjective ratings to managers whose objective measure of sales performance is measured with greater noise, and to managers who face higher performance target difficulty, the latter assessed both prior to (ex ante) and subsequent to (ex post) the evaluation period. These results obtain after controlling for manager ability and performance, and for alternative mechanisms to mitigate differences in compensation risk (e.g., salary changes, sales target changes, and bonus adjustments). The evidence suggests that supervisors use discretion in subjective ratings to provide manager-specific risk premiums for non-executive managers who are subject to an OSFA contract.

公司通常使用“一刀切”（OSFA）薪酬合同，该合同规定了从事类似工作的非执行经理在绩效与薪酬（即绩效奖金）之间的通用公式关系。但是，如果操作环境中的异质性产生不同的薪酬风险，那么对于个体经理人而言，平均而言适当的合同可能不是最佳选择。我们使用来自零售公司的现场数据，该公司为其商店经理介绍了OSFA奖金补偿计划。常见的奖金公式是基于客观的绩效指标和主管的主观评分的加权总和。该公司希望主管们的主观判断力能够评估难以衡量的维度（例如商店外观）的绩效。事前）和（后续事后）评估期。这些结果是在控制经理的能力和绩效以及减轻薪酬风险差异（例如薪资变动，销售目标变动和奖金调整）的替代机制之后获得的。有证据表明，主管在主观评级中使用酌处权为受OSFA合同约束的非执行经理提供经理特定的风险溢价。