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Subjective bonuses and target setting in budget-based incentive contracts
Management Accounting Research ( IF 4.344 ) Pub Date : 2018-07-27 , DOI: 10.1016/j.mar.2018.07.003
Carmen Aranda , Javier Arellano , Antonio Davila

Subjective bonuses can reflect implicit contracts entered at the beginning of the period when certain employees commit to more difficult targets and managers use subjective bonuses at the end of the period to reward this commitment. We examine this prediction in a budget-based incentive systems’ setting. We argue that the presence of these implicit contracts allows managers to adapt targets to the individual characteristics of employees and their units with the purpose of enhancing the motivational structure of budget-based contracts. Using data from 414 branches of a large travel retailer during a four-year period, we find that managers use their discretion to set targets at different levels of difficulty across branches and subjective bonuses are sensitive to the difficulty of these targets. Branches with more difficult targets relative to their peers receive larger subjective bonuses. We also test the motivational effect of larger subjective bonuses and find that they have a positive effect on future performance. In particular, larger target increases (relative to peers) from current to the next period result in larger performance increase (relative to peers) when the branch is rewarded with higher subjective bonuses in the current period. The evidence indicates that subjective bonuses can fulfill roles beyond addressing performance measurement systems’ limitations. Managers use them to reward employees’ commitment to target difficulty and to motivate future performance.



中文翻译:

基于预算的激励合同中的主观奖金和目标设定

主观奖金可以反映在某些员工承诺更困难的目标时期初签订的隐性合同,而经理在期末使用主观奖金来兑现这一承诺。我们在基于预算的激励系统的环境中检查了这一预测。我们认为,这些隐性合同的存在使管理人员可以根据员工及其单位的个性特征调整目标,以增强预算合同的激励结构。通过使用大型旅游零售商的414个分支机构在四年内的数据,我们发现经理们可以运用自己的判断力将目标设置为跨分支机构的不同难度级别,而主观奖金对这些目标的难度很敏感。与同行相比,目标难度更高的分支机构会获得更大的主观奖金。我们还测试了较大的主观奖金的激励作用,发现它们对未来的表现有积极的影响。特别是,当分支机构在当前期间获得较高的主观奖金时,从当前到下一期间的较大目标增长(相对于同级)会导致较大的性能增长(相对于同级)。有证据表明,主观奖金可以超越绩效评估系统的局限性而发挥作用。经理们使用它们来奖励员工致力于解决困难和激励未来表现的承诺。我们还测试了较大的主观奖金的激励作用,发现它们对未来的表现有积极的影响。特别是,当分支机构在当前期间获得较高的主观奖金时,从当前到下一期间的较大目标增长(相对于同级)会导致较大的性能增长(相对于同级)。有证据表明,主观奖金可以超越绩效评估系统的局限性而发挥作用。经理们使用它们来奖励员工致力于解决困难和激励未来表现的承诺。我们还测试了较大的主观奖金的激励作用,发现它们对未来的表现有积极的影响。特别是,当分支机构在当前期间获得较高的主观奖金时,从当前到下一期间的较大目标增长(相对于同级)会导致较大的性能增长(相对于同级)。有证据表明,主观奖金可以超越绩效评估系统的局限性而发挥作用。经理们使用它们来奖励员工致力于解决困难和激励未来表现的承诺。有证据表明,主观奖金可以超越绩效评估系统的局限性而发挥作用。经理们使用它们来奖励员工致力于解决困难和激励未来表现的承诺。有证据表明,主观奖金可以超越绩效评估系统的局限性而发挥作用。经理们使用它们来奖励员工致力于解决困难和激励未来表现的承诺。

更新日期:2018-07-27
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