International transfer pricing within decentralized multinational enterprises (MNEs) is considerably complex when transfer prices concurrently have to satisfy taxation and managerial accounting objectives. We consider an MNE consisting of an upstream subsidiary in one country and a possibly divisionalized downstream subsidiary in another country. We find that the inherent trade-off of international transfer pricing between the upstream and the downstream subsidiary can be alleviated by divisionalizing the downstream subsidiary and implementing an appropriate domestic transfer price between the divisions of the downstream subsidiary. As a consequence, the MNE might deliberately divisionalize a subsidiary even when divisionalization diminishes the flow of information. Importantly, divisionalization can only be effective if the optimal domestic transfer price not only accounts for the costs of the internally traded good but also for tax differentials.

当转移价格必须同时满足税收和管理会计目标时，分散式跨国企业（MNE）中的国际转移定价就相当复杂。我们考虑一个跨国公司，该跨国公司由一个国家的上游子公司和另一个国家的可能划分的下游子公司组成。我们发现，可以通过对下游子公司进行划分并在下游子公司之间进行适当的国内转让价格来减轻上游子公司与下游子公司之间国际转移定价的固有权衡。结果，即使分公司减少了信息流，跨国公司也可能会故意对子公司进行分公司。重要的，