当前位置: X-MOL 学术Linguist. Philos. › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Semantic expressivism for epistemic modals
Linguistics and Philosophy ( IF 1.167 ) Pub Date : 2020-03-23 , DOI: 10.1007/s10988-020-09295-7
Peter Hawke , Shane Steinert-Threlkeld

Expressivists about epistemic modals deny that ‘Jane might be late’ canonically serves to express the speaker’s acceptance of a certain propositional content. Instead, they hold that it expresses a lack of acceptance (that Jane isn’t late). Prominent expressivists embrace pragmatic expressivism: the doxastic property expressed by a declarative is not helpfully identified with (any part of) that sentence’s compositional semantic value. Against this, we defend semantic expressivism about epistemic modals: the semantic value of a declarative from this domain is (partly) the property of doxastic attitudes it canonically serves to express. In support, we synthesize data from the critical literature on expressivism—largely reflecting interactions between modals and disjunctions—and present a semantic expressivism that readily predicts the data. This contrasts with salient competitors, including: pragmatic expressivism based on domain semantics or dynamic semantics; semantic expressivism à la Moss (Semant Pragmat 8(5):1–81, 2015. https://doi.org/10.3765/sp.8.5 ); and the bounded relational semantics of Mandelkern (Philos Rev 128(1):1–61, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-7213001 ).

中文翻译:

认知模态的语义表现主义

关于认知模态的表达主义者否认“简可能迟到”规范地用于表达说话者对某个命题内容的接受。相反,他们认为这表示不接受(简没有迟到)。杰出的表达主义者接受语用表达主义:声明式表达的信念属性与该句子的组成语义价值(的任何部分)没有帮助。针对这一点,我们捍卫关于认知模态的语义表达主义:来自该领域的声明语的语义价值(部分)是它规范地用来表达的信念态度的属性。作为支持,我们综合了关于表现主义的批评文献中的数据——主要反映了模态和析取之间的相互作用——并提出了一种易于预测数据的语义表现主义。这与突出的竞争对手形成对比,包括:基于领域语义或动态语义的语用表现主义;语义表现主义 à la Moss (Semant Pragmat 8(5):1–81, 2015. https://doi.org/10.3765/sp.8.5); 以及 Mandelkern 的有界关系语义(Philos Rev 128(1):1–61, 2019. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-7213001)。
更新日期:2020-03-23
down
wechat
bug