This article argues that the notion of a promissory right captures a central feature of the morality of promising which cannot be explained by the notion of promissory obligation alone: the fact that the promisee acquires a full range of control over the promisor’s obligation. It defends two main claims. First, it argues that promissory rights are distinctively grounded in our interest in controlling others’ deontic world. Second, it proposes a version of the ‘Interest Theory’ of rights (the ‘Deontic Interest Theory’) that incorporates our interest in purely deontic forms of control into the various human interests that constitute the grounds of our rights.

中文翻译：

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承诺、权利和道义控制

本文认为，允诺权的概念抓住了允诺道德的一个核心特征，这不能仅用允诺义务的概念来解释：受诺人获得了对允诺人义务的全面控制这一事实。它为两项主要主张辩护。首先，它认为约定权利的独特基础在于我们对控制他人的道义世界的兴趣。其次，它提出了权利的“利益理论”（“道义利益理论”）的一个版本，将我们对纯粹道义控制形式的兴趣纳入构成我们权利基础的各种人类利益。