Public reason liberalism is defined by the idea that laws and policies should be justifiable to each person who is subject to them. But what does it mean for reasons to be public or, in other words, suitable for this process of justification? In response to this question, Kevin Vallier has recently developed the traditional distinction between consensus and convergence public reason into a classification distinguishing three main approaches: shareability, accessibility and intelligibility. The goal of this paper is to defend the accessibility approach by demonstrating its ability to strike an appealing middle course in terms of inclusivity between shareability (which is over-exclusive) and intelligibility (which is under-exclusive). We first argue against Vallier that accessibility can exclude religious reasons from public justification. Second, we use scientific reasons as a case study to show that accessibility excludes considerably fewer reasons than shareability. Throughout the paper, we connect our discussion of accessibility to John Rawls’s model of public reason, so as to give substance to the accessibility approach and to further our understanding of Rawls’s influential model.

中文翻译：

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拯救公共理性自由主义的可访问性要求

公共理性自由主义的定义是法律和政策对每个受其约束的人都是合理的。但是，公开的理由，或者换言之，适合这个正当化过程意味着什么？针对这个问题，Kevin Vallier 最近将共识和融合公共理性之间的传统区分发展为区分三种主要方法的分类：可共享性、可访问性和可理解性。本文的目标是通过展示其在可共享性（过度排他性）和可理解性（非排他性）之间的包容性方面取得有吸引力的中间路线的能力来捍卫可访问性方法。我们首先反对 Vallier，认为可访问性可以将宗教原因排除在公共辩护之外。第二，我们使用科学原因作为案例研究来表明可访问性排除的原因比可共享性要少得多。在整篇论文中，我们将我们对可访问性的讨论与约翰罗尔斯的公共理性模型联系起来，以便为可访问性方法提供实质内容并进一步理解罗尔斯的影响模型。