In matters of responsibility, there are often two sides to the transaction: one party who holds another responsible, and the other who (ideally) takes responsibility for her conduct. The first side has been closely scrutinized in discussions of the nature of responsibility, due to the influential Strawsonian conjecture that an agent is responsible if and only if it is (in some sense) appropriate to hold her responsible. This preoccupation with holding responsible – with its focus on the second-personal perspective and on responses like blame – contrasts with a relative neglect of the perspective of the agent and the role that she has to play by taking responsibility. I aim to show that this neglect is undeserved – that taking responsibility is both distinct in character from holding responsible and fundamentally important in its own right. I develop a conception of taking responsibility that reveals an under-explored dimension of our responsibility practices.

中文翻译：

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担当作为，担当作为

在责任问题上，交易通常有两个方面：一方对另一方负责，另一方（理想情况下）对其行为负责。由于有影响力的斯特劳森猜想，当且仅当（在某种意义上）让代理人负责时，代理人才负责，因此在关于责任性质的讨论中，第一方受到了密切关注。这种对承担责任的关注——专注于第二人称视角和诸如责备之类的反应——与相对忽视代理人的视角以及她在承担责任时必须扮演的角色形成鲜明对比。我的目的是表明这种忽视是不应该的——承担责任与承担责任在性质上是截然不同的，而且它本身具有根本的重要性。