According to the Behavioral View of consent, consent must be expressed in behavior in order to release someone from a duty. By contrast, the Mental View of consent is that normatively efficacious consent is entirely mental. In previous work, I defended a version of the Behavioral View, according to which normatively efficacious ‘consent always requires public behavior, and this behavior must take the form of communication in the case of high-stakes consent’. In this essay, I respond to two arguments by proponents of the Mental View. First, Larry Alexander, Heidi Hurd and Peter Westen have argued that my view has mistaken implications concerning the culpability of different actors. I counter that my version of the view does not have these implications, as it leaves us free to draw moral and legal distinctions between different offences involving non-consensual behavior. Second, Larry Alexander and Kimberly Ferzan have argued for an analogy between consent and abandonment: on the grounds that the normative power to abandon resides in one’s will, Alexander and Ferzan concludes consent does too. I counter that abandonment requires behavior, and call into question the assumption that the ethics of property have much to teach us about the ethics of sexual consent.

中文翻译：

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同意、沟通和放弃

根据同意的行为观点，同意必须在行为中表达出来，才能解除某人的责任。相比之下，同意的心理观点是规范有效的同意完全是心理上的。在之前的工作中，我为行为观的一个版本辩护，根据该观点，规范有效的“同意总是需要公共行为，而这种行为在高风险同意的情况下必须采取沟通的形式”。在这篇文章中，我回应了心理观支持者的两个论点。首先，拉里·亚历山大（Larry Alexander）、海蒂·赫德（Heidi Hurd）和彼得·韦斯特恩（Peter Westen）认为，我的观点对不同行为者的罪责有错误的含义。我反驳说我的观点版本没有这些含义，因为它让我们可以自由地在涉及非自愿行为的不同罪行之间进行道德和法律区分。其次，拉里·亚历山大 (Larry Alexander) 和金伯利·费尔赞 (Larry Alexander) 和金伯利·费尔赞 (Kimberly Ferzan) 认为同意和放弃之间的类比：基于放弃的规范性权力存在于一个人的意志中，亚历山大和费尔赞得出的结论是同意也是如此。我反驳说放弃需要行为，并质疑财产伦理对性同意伦理有很多教给我们的假设。