Should the law punish the mere utterance of lies even if the listener has not been deceived? Seana Shiffrin has recently answered this question in the affirmative. She argues that pure lying as such harms the moral fabric of sincerity and distorts the testimonial warrants which underpin communication. The article begins with a discussion of Shiffrin’s account of lying as a moral wrong and the idea of impersonal harm to moral goods. Then I raise two objections to her theory. First, it does not explain persuasively why the fabric of sincerity is so vulnerable to pure lying. Second, it underestimates the need for a causal link between the alleged harm and the speech the government suppresses. I explore the function of the causal inquiry in constitutional law and suggest that if Shiffrin’s theory were to become the standard for adjudication in freedom of expression cases, protection for speech would deteriorate.

中文翻译：

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说谎、言语和非人身伤害

即使听众没有被欺骗，法律是否应该惩罚仅仅说谎？Seana Shiffrin 最近对这个问题给出了肯定的回答。她认为，纯粹的谎言本身会损害真诚的道德结构，并扭曲支撑交流的证词。文章首先讨论了 Shiffrin 将说谎视为道德错误以及对道德善的非个人伤害的想法。然后我对她的理论提出了两个反对意见。首先，它没有令人信服地解释为什么真诚的结构如此容易受到纯粹的谎言的伤害。其次，它低估了所谓的伤害与政府压制的言论之间存在因果关系的必要性。