Abstract Although presidents regularly elevate district court judges to fill appellate court vacancies, research to date suggests that presidents elevate judges who are further from their preferences than nominees outside the federal judiciary. Current research also does not offer a satisfactory answer of when and why presidents decide to elevate. I argue that presidents are likely to decide to elevate when they perceive political conditions that they think will lead to a nominee facing a difficult confirmation battle in the Senate. Once they decide to elevate, they then elevate judges further from their preferences, knowing they will have the conciliatory prize of being able to fill a newly opened district court seat. This argument is bolstered by recent work that theorizes that judicial nominations and confirmations are dynamic, and not one-shot activities that gridlock models of advice and consent would suggest. The results of this analysis bear out my hypotheses. Presidents typically elevate when the ideological balance of an appellate court is at stake and, when they do, they often elevate district judges who are further from their preferences than they otherwise would. In fact, the district judges they elevate frequently resemble ideologically the appellate judges they are replacing.

中文翻译：

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上诉法院的司法提名和提升地位的战略决定

摘要 尽管总统定期提升地区法院法官以填补上诉法院的空缺，但迄今为止的研究表明，与联邦司法机构以外的被提名人相比，总统提升的法官与他们的偏好相距甚远。目前的研究也没有就总统决定升职的时间和原因提供令人满意的答案。我认为，当总统认为政治状况会导致被提名人在参议院面临艰难的确认战时，他们可能会决定升职。一旦他们决定升职，他们就会从他们的偏好中进一步提升法官的地位，因为他们知道他们将获得能够填补新开设的地区法院席位的和解奖。这一论点得到了最近的工作的支持，这些工作将司法提名和确认是动态的理论化，而不是僵局建议和同意模型所建议的一次性活动。这个分析的结果证实了我的假设。当上诉法院的意识形态平衡受到威胁时，总统通常会提升，并且当他们这样做时，他们通常会提升与他们的偏好相比更远的地区法官。事实上，他们提升的地区法官在意识形态上经常与他们所取代的上诉法官相似。