People who delay claiming Social Security receive higher lifelong benefits upon retirement. We survey individuals on their willingness to delay claiming later, if they could receive a lump sum in lieu of a higher annuity payment. Using a moment-matching approach, we calibrate a lifecycle model tracking observed claiming patterns under current rules and predict optimal claiming outcomes under the lump sum approach. Our model correctly predicts that early claimers under current rules would delay claiming most when offered actuarially fair lump sums, and for lump sums worth 87% as much, claiming ages would still be higher than at present.

中文翻译：

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一次性激励下的最优社会保障索赔行为：理论与证据

延迟申领社会保障的人在退休后可获得更高的终身福利。我们调查了个人是否愿意在以后推迟索赔，如果他们可以一次性领取代替更高的年金付款。使用矩匹配方法，我们校准了一个生命周期模型，跟踪当前规则下观察到的索赔模式，并预测一次性总付法下的最佳索赔结果。我们的模型正确地预测，当提供精算公平的一次性付款时，根据现行规则的早期索赔者将延迟索赔最多，而对于价值 87% 的一次性索赔，索赔年龄仍会高于目前。