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The curse of low-valued recycling
Journal of Regulatory Economics ( IF 1.553 ) Pub Date : 2019-03-12 , DOI: 10.1007/s11149-019-09378-9
Hiroaki Ino , Norimichi Matsueda

This paper discusses how to deal with low-valued recyclable wastes whose reprocessing itself does not pay financially. While such a recycling activity can potentially improve social welfare if the social costs associated with their disposal are sufficiently significant, governmental policies to promote recycling may lead to illegal disposal. Explicitly considering the monitoring cost in preventing firms from disposing of collected wastes illicitly, we show that the second-best policy for a low-valued recyclable is either one of the two following schemes: a deposit-refund scheme (DRS) that gives birth to a recycling market and an advanced-disposal fee that does not create a recycling market. However, in order to select the optimal policy scheme and implement it appropriately, a policymaker needs information available only in the recycling market. Thus, the structure of the second-best policy itself entails critical information issues in its implementation, which is in stark contrast to a DRS for a non-low-valued recyclable.

中文翻译:

低价值回收的诅咒

本文讨论了如何处理低价值可回收废物,这些废物的后处理本身并不能带来经济效益。如果与回收相关的社会成本足够大,则此类回收活动可以潜在地改善社会福利,但是促进回收的政府政策可能导致非法处置。明确考虑了防止公司非法处置所收集废物的监控成本,我们表明,低价值可循环再利用的第二好政策是以下两个方案之一:产生存款的退款计划(DRS)回收市场和不构成回收市场的预处置费。但是,为了选择最佳的策略方案并适当地实施它,决策者需要仅在回收市场中可用的信息。
更新日期:2019-03-12
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