This paper characterizes equilibrium behavior in an auction where firms bid a unit price in order to fund and gain access to a new piece of infrastructure. Firms need access to this new infrastructure to sell their output in a competitive market. The new facility is built only if enough revenue is generated through the sale of access to the firms. We show by means of an example that this auction mechanism can dominate in terms of efficiency the standard mechanism where a uniform access price is determined ex-ante by a regulator.

中文翻译：

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为自然垄断基础设施扩张提供资金：拍卖与规范的统一接入价格

本文描述了拍卖中的均衡行为，在这种拍卖中，企业竞标单价以资助并获得新的基础设施。企业需要使用这种新的基础架构才能在竞争激烈的市场中出售其产品。只有通过出售对公司的访问权产生足够的收入，才能建立新的设施。我们通过一个例子说明，这种拍卖机制可以在效率方面主导标准机制，在这种机制下，监管者事先确定统一的接入价格。