This paper examines the potential effects of the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010 on banks’ noninterest expenses. Using data on U.S. bank holding companies from 1995 through 2016, we test whether noninterest expenses increase following the passage of the Dodd–Frank Act or in relation to the number of banking regulations implemented after Dodd–Frank. We analyze subsamples of banks above and below $10 billion in total assets and consider total noninterest expenses, salaries, non-salary expenses, and specific subcategories of non-salary expenses: legal, consulting, auditing, and data processing. Non-salary expenses for both large and small banks show a one-time increase after Dodd–Frank, while salary expenses tend to increase with regulations. The results indicate that total noninterest expenses for the banking system are higher on average by more than $50 billion per year compared to before the Dodd–Frank Act.

中文翻译：

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多德-弗兰克是否影响了银行支出？

本文研究了2010年《多德-弗兰克法案》对银行非利息支出的潜在影响。使用1995年至2016年美国银行控股公司的数据，我们测试了《多德-弗兰克法案》通过后非利息支出是否增加，还是与多德-弗兰克法案实施后实施的银行法规数量有关。我们分析总资产超过或低于100亿美元的银行的子样本，并考虑总的非利息支出，工资，非工资支出以及非工资支出的特定子类别：法律，咨询，审计和数据处理。在多德-弗兰克之后，大型和小型银行的非工资性支出都显示了一次性的增长，而工资性支出则随着法规的增加而增加。