ABSTRACT Wisdom, long a topic of interest to moral philosophers, is increasingly the focus of social science research. Philosophers have historically been concerned to develop a rationally defensible account of the nature of wisdom and its role in the moral life, often inspired in various ways by virtue theoretical accounts of practical wisdom (phronesis). Wisdom scientists seek to, among other things, define wisdom and its components so that we can measure them. Are the measures used by wisdom scientists actually measuring what philosophers have in mind when they discuss practical wisdom? I argue that they are not. Contemporary measures of wisdom and its components may pick out some necessary prerequisites of practical wisdom, but they do not measure a philosophically plausible practical wisdom or its components. After explaining the argument and defending it against objections, I consider its implications. Should wisdom scientists ignore the philosophical conception of practical wisdom in favor of other conceptions, revise their methods to try to measure it, or continue the interdisciplinary study of practical wisdom without expecting to measure it? I make a preliminary argument for the third option.

中文翻译：

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我们可以衡量实践智慧吗？

摘要 智慧，长期以来一直是道德哲学家感兴趣的话题，越来越成为社会科学研究的焦点。历史上，哲学家一直致力于对智慧的本质及其在道德生活中的作用进行合理的辩护，通常以各种方式受到实践智慧（phronesis）的美德理论解释的启发。智慧科学家寻求定义智慧及其组成部分，以便我们可以衡量它们。智慧科学家使用的衡量标准是否真的衡量哲学家在讨论实践智慧时的想法？我认为他们不是。当代对智慧及其组成部分的衡量可能会挑选出实践智慧的一些必要先决条件，但它们并没有衡量哲学上似是而非的实践智慧或其组成部分。在解释了这个论点并针对反对意见进行辩护之后，我考虑了它的含义。智慧科学家是否应该忽略实践智慧的哲学概念而支持其他概念，修改他们的方法以尝试衡量它，还是继续跨学科研究实践智慧而不期望衡量它？我对第三个选项进行初步论证。