Financial intermediaries devote resources to finding and screening borrowers before lending capital. By retaining only sufficiently good matches, informed lenders exacerbate adverse selection problems for others lending in the same market. Failure to internalize this implies that informed lenders are too selective in the matches they retain. The resulting under-use of capital pushes the cost of capital down, decreasing the benefit of being informed rather than uninformed and prompting a reallocation of resources from screening to matching. Compared to the constrained efficient allocation, the decentralized equilibrium has too little screening, too little informed credit, and too much uninformed credit.

金融中介机构将资源用于在借出资金之前寻找和筛选借款人。通过仅保留足够好的匹配，知情的贷方会加剧在同一市场中其他贷款的不利选择问题。无法内部化，这意味着知情的贷方在他们保留的比赛中过于挑剔。由此导致的资本使用不足，降低了资本成本，降低了被告知而不是被告知的好处，并促使资源从筛选到匹配重新分配。与受约束的有效分配相比，分散式均衡的筛选过少，知情信用过低以及未知情信用过高。