The conclusion of Kafka's celebrated parable ‘Before the Law’ is all too well known: the country man dies without ever gaining access to the law. It also provides an apt background to Phil Clark's Distant Justice. The book's intent is to assess critically the politics of the International Criminal Court (ICC), focusing specifically on the cases of Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and providing broader insights on the African continent. Read in the context of the deep – and apparently intractable – crisis of a Court that stands accused of bias against the African continent, this book is particularly timely. The ICC was established in 1998 as the first permanent global court tasked with prosecuting the most egregious crimes worldwide – genocide, crimes against humanity, crimes of war, and (since 2010) aggression. As such, it was celebrated as the revival of a ‘Nuremberg legacy’ left dormant throughout the Cold War. Yet the Court's decision to acquit former Ivory Coast President Laurent Gbagbo in January 2019 came at the tail‐end of a series of failed cases – a failure rate that stands unprecedented in the global justice landscape.22 Since 2002, the ICC has pronounced only three convictions, including one overturned on appeal. Eleven proceedings have failed out of a total of 22 completed cases since 2002. Four accused have been acquitted. Four cases were dismissed. Proceedings were abandoned in two other cases. In a context of wider contests against the Court – from the US but also from states originally favorable to it, starting with African states themselves – without the support of African states, indeed, it seems the very existence of the ICC stands in the dock.

Clark's conclusions are bleak. He traces the ICC's failures in Africa to one core dynamic: distance. The physical, institutional, and demographic distance of the Court ‘from the African societies in which it intervenes has been damaging, both to the Court and to local politics’ (p. 17). In keeping with his long‐established and prolific research on peace, truth, justice, and reconciliation across various parts of the African continent as a Professor of International Politics at the SOAS in London, Clark marshals an impressive body of evidence to support his thesis. Through multi‐sited and multi‐level methodology fieldwork – carried out over the course of 11 years, through 653 interviews with ICC personnel, senior Ugandan officials and DRC political and judicial officials, civil society and religious leaders, and former rebel combatants, as well as 426 interviews with everyday people in Uganda and the DRC – Clark essentially chronicles the history of the ICC since inception. In the meantime, he manages the rare feat of looking both inside the Court and outside of it – that is, in some of the country contexts in which it has been involved, from the state apparatus down to the local level of communities’ perceptions of international criminal justice.

One of the book's main arguments is ‘that the ICC represents a unique form of foreign intervention in African affairs insofar as it views distance and detachment from the domestic realm as a virtue because, it believes, this maintains the Court's neutrality and impartiality’ (p. 13). This, Clark argues, stems from the paradox of a Court that is both independent and interdependent. The politics that undergirded the principle of complementarity – a core feature of the Court, according to which states have the first responsibility and right to prosecute international crimes – aimed at avoiding sovereignty clashes. Yet the practice of the Court so far, Clark claims, has tended to be dominated by a legal conception of complementarity, which establishes an extremely high threshold for states to claim jurisdiction over cases within their territory. On the other hand, ‘distance’, he claims, ‘is encoded in the DNA of the ICC’ (p. 25): unlike other practices of external interventions, indeed, the law ‘views distance as an inherent virtue’ (p. 308).

More than physical and geographical remoteness, the ‘distancing’ tendencies of the Court, specifically espoused by its prosecutorial practices that stand at the heart of Clark's critique, have deliberately aimed at using the law as a means of operating above politics. This, he claims, has embedded within the operations of the Court the double vicious effect of isolating the ICC from national social contexts and marshalling hegemonic tendencies under the cover of universality. Clark argues that the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP)’s politics of distance have thereby rendered the Court vulnerable to domestic politics – especially in countries like Uganda and the DRC where ‘self‐referrals’ have been part and parcel of domestic politics. Further, the Court represents ‘a view from somewhere (Western liberalism) and a highly contradictory and counter‐productive one at that’ (p. 305). Distancing, Clark argues, has not only side‐stepped domestic judicial processes; it also quenches what he sees as national choices to facilitate peace, and foremost community‐based visions of justice and responses to atrocity.

Based on this bleak chronicle, which he extends to a survey of other African situations, Clark's response aims at being practical. The Court, he claims, needs to be politically savvier by achieving ‘politically grounded legalism’ or ‘prudent politics’ (p. 309). That is, it needs to morph from an essentially itinerant and short‐term institution – one whose interactions with national spheres (what he traces as the ‘intersections’ between international criminal justice processes and national outcomes) are defined by the judicial politics of individual cases – to an institution invested at the local level, demographically proximate through a representative African staff, and effectively present on site, including by holding trials in situ.

Clark's book enters the fold of a now abundant scholarship on the ICC. One of its main (and undisputable) virtues is the extensive and long‐term nature of the research – that is, the sheer mass of data collected over the course of 11 years, both at the Court itself and across national and local sites. Yet as a scholarly intervention, Clark also espouses what seems to characterize debates on the ICC: an intellectual trench warfare between friends and foes of the Court. This is epitomized by the debates sparked by what commentators have widely characterized as a ‘divorce’ between the ICC and African states33 See S. Allison, ‘African Revolt Threatens International Criminal Court's Legitimacy’ Guardian, 27 October 2016 <https://www.theguardian.com/law/2016/oct/27/african-revolt-international-criminal-court-gambia>. – following the African Union (AU) Extraordinary session of October 2013 organized around the threat of a collective pull‐out of African states from the Rome Statute – and specifically discussions around Clark's book.44 See P. Labuda and T. B. Bouwknegt (eds), ‘Symposium on Phil Clark's Distant Justice’ Opinio Juris, 30 September 2019 <https://opiniojuris.org/2019/09/30/symposium-on-phil-clarks-distant-justice/>. While Burundi is the only state yet to have effectively pulled out of the Rome Statute, some commentators have been quick to assert that the demurely termed ‘fraught’ relationship between the AU and the ICC was nurtured by misperceptions and misunderstandings: they therefore see this not so much as a ‘withdrawal’ strategy as a call for ‘reforming’ the ICC, starting with the role played by permanent members of the Security Council.55 See M. Kersten, ‘How Three Words Could Change the ICC–Africa Relationship’ Justice in Conflict, 9 May 2017 <https://justiceinconflict.org/2017/05/09/how-three-words-could-change-the-icc-africa-relationship/#more-7344>. Others have pinpointed that there is no working alternative for an ‘African’ version of global justice, as the 2014 Malabo Protocol instituting a criminal chamber within the African Court of Justice and Human Rights is still unlikely to enter into force.66 Fifteen member states need to ratify the protocol. As of 1 July 2019, 15 states had signed it but none had ratified it.

While downplaying the rift between Africa and the ICC, these responses still tend to reproduce the lines of an ideological war of position between a neo‐colonial form of global justice and the wheels (albeit rusty) of universalism. Here, Clark stands at one end of the spectrum, through his denunciation of the Court's ‘hegemonic tendencies’ (p. 310) while others, such as Carlson, explicitly espouse the Western liberalism enshrined in the project for international criminal justice with the aim of ‘perfecting’ it.77 K. Carlson, Model(ing) Justice: Perfecting the Promise of International Criminal Law (2018). This opposition between the denunciation of the ICC as the epitome of ‘tropical justice … at the service of the powerful’88 P. Kipré, ‘Procès Laurent Gbagbo à la CPI: Pour le Droit et la Justice’ Jeune Afrique, 30 January 2019 <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/723354/societe/tribune-proces-laurent-gbagbo-a-la-cpi-pour-le-droit-et-la-justice/>. Author's translation from French. and calls for the ICC to ‘exclusively use the language of the law’99 M. Bergsmo, ‘La CPI, l'Affaire Gbagbo et le Rôle de la France’ Le Monde, 18 January 2019 <https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/01/18/la-cpi-l-affaire-gbagbo-et-le-role-de-la-france_5410996_3212.html>. Author's translation from French. signals the acute difficulty of situating the critique of the ICC. First and foremost, such debates illustrate what could be described as the ‘bunkerization’ of the Court among the very restricted market of scholars and practitioners clustered around the Hague1010 See S. Dezalay, ‘L'Afrique contre la Cour Pénale Internationale? Éléments de Sociogenèse sur les Possibles de la Justice Internationale’ (2017) 146 Politique Africaine 165. – whereby what Clark aptly construes as law's ‘inherent virtue’ of distance (p. 37) is seen to have become the only available weapon against the perceived ‘politicization’ of the Court.

However, it is not enough, simply, to ‘do justice to the political’1111 S. M. H. Nouwen and W. G. Werner, ‘Doing Justice to the Political: The International Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan’ (2011) 21 The European J. of International Law 941. by opposing the ICC as a hegemonic endeavour against the perceived virtues of national and foremost community responses to atrocities. The risk is to fall into the trap of ‘reinventing’ tradition1212 E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger (eds), The Invention of Tradition (1983). – albeit under the claimed benevolent guise of a critique of imperialism. A cynical observer, indeed, could see in Clark's defense – and objectification – of such local processes as the mato oput in Uganda nothing different to the colonizers’ reinvention of ‘custom’ across colonial Africa. The pitfall lies in the theorization itself of what Clark describes as ‘distance’. While Clark's analysis does open the black box of the ICC as an institution – something that few studies have succeeded in doing so far,1313 See J. Meierenrich, ‘The Evolution of the Office of the Prosecutor at the International Criminal Court: Insights from Institutional Theory’ in The First Global Prosecutor: Promises and Constraints, eds M. Minow et al. (2015) 97. by tracing the OTP's strategies and practices – it still illustrates what could be construed as a reciprocal blindness between lawyers and politics scholars on international courts and their operations. ‘International law is so primitive, that for us it is law, but for others it is just one option among others.’1414 Author's interview (with Ron Levi) with Luis Moreno Ocampo, Toronto, 8 November 2012. This lapidary comment by Luis Moreno Ocampo, the first Prosecutor of the ICC, reflects the overwhelming tendency in ongoing debates on the ICC to adopt a narrow, functionalist focus on international criminal courts qua judicial institutions. Thus, ‘justice often remains a kind of background, an institution taken as a given, static in its (legal) forms and equal in its effects (of legitimation)’.1515 A. Vauchez, ‘La Justice comme “Institution Politique”: Retour sur un Objet (Longtemps) Perdu de la Science Politique’ (2006) 63–64 Droit et Société 491, at 493. Author's translation from French. To boot: Clark sees domestic courts as ‘institutions that are arguably most like’ the ICC (p. 150). Yet this points to a misunderstanding about the Court – it is not a giant version of domestic courts – as much as about what the concept of distance should entail.

It is, indeed, the articulation between law and politics itself that needs to be fed back into the debate: as a core driver in the constitution and legitimation of national state power – as traced by Pierre Bourdieu in his posthumous Sur l’État1616 P. Bourdieu, Sur l’État: Cours au Collège de France (1989–1992) (2012). – as much as in the structure of the international as an arena of projection of national interests and of the institutionalization of the legalization of politics. Distance, thus, is in law's DNA, but it reflects a constant tension – or double bind – between law and politics. The research path opened by Kantorowicz1717 E. Kantorowicz, Les Deux Corps du Roi (1989). and others in his wake has shown that lawyers are structurally positioned to play ‘double games’.1818 See Y. Dezalay and B. G. Garth, ‘State Politics and Legal Markets’ (2011) 10 Comparative Sociology 38. While at the service of power holders – and thus playing a central role in the legitimation of state power – lawyers also need to distance themselves from politics, as a condition to protect the autonomy of the law, and with it their professional practices.

On the other hand, certainly, the very mandate of the ICC – which enables it to perform ‘real‐time’ justice, not only ex post but also ex ante, by launching prosecutions in the context of ongoing conflicts – has exacerbated the perceived cleavage between justice and politics as two antithetical goals. Yet these oppositions also highlight the structural embeddedness in politics of international criminal justice as a ‘weak field’ – that is, a space that is weak as regards its internal autonomy but not weak in its wider social effects.1919 S. Dezalay, ‘Weakness as Routine in the Operations of the International Criminal Court’ (2016) 17 International Criminal Law Rev. 281. In this sense, the structure itself of the OTP – with its Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Division designed specifically to act as an interface with diplomatic milieux and the international non‐governmental organizations (INGOs) that gravitate around the Court – reflects the double strategy of survival adopted by international criminal tribunals since the 1990s, through accretion2020 For example, beyond a case law built in reference to the experience of previous international criminal tribunals, the prosecution strategies of the ICC relied in great part on these antecedents (with about a third of the personnel coming from the ad hoc tribunals). See S. Dezalay, op. cit., n. 19. and institutional conversion,2121 See H. Schoenfeld et al., ‘Crises Extrêmes et Institutionnalisation du Droit Pénal International’ (2007) 36 Critique Internationale 37. designed to respond to the specific features of the ‘atypical political environment’ in which they are embedded.2222 R. Levi et al., ‘International Courts in Atypical Political Environments: The Interplay of Prosecutorial Strategy, Evidence, and Court Authority in International Criminal Law’ (2016) 78 Law and Contemporary Problems 289.

First and foremost, this unpacking of distance as, indeed, an inherent feature of the law, but also as part and parcel of the structuration of the international as an arena of projection of national political struggles, highlights that international criminal justice is a ‘symbolic’ market – that is, to use Bourdieu's reflections,2323 P. Bourdieu, ‘Le Marché des Biens Symboliques’ (1971) 22 L'Année Sociologique 49. a space in which the belief in global justice as a symbolic good is a condition for the authority of global justice institutions. Certainly, it is a market that remains exceptionally contested. The ICC constitutes the most prominent institutionalized dimension of a diffuse ‘reforming common sense’2424 C. Topalov (ed.), Laboratoires du Nouveau Siècle : La Nébuleuse Réformatrice et Ses Réseaux en France (1880–1914) (1999). on the criminalization of state and armed violence worldwide, but it operates in a global space where the judicial response to such crimes remains questioned, fragmented, and uneven. Crucially, however, tracing international criminal justice as a symbolic market points to the dynamic relationship between restricted markets of producers and wider markets of users of global justice. Looking only at one end of this space – be it the discourse produced by and for the ICC, or the discourses of contenders of the Court – can at best shed a partial light on how this space functions. This underlines the necessity of understanding the structure of positions, over time, within the ICC, within competing international spaces for the criminalization of certain practices, and within national fields of state power in the Global North and the Global South, as much as tracing the dynamic relationship between these national and international spaces. This is by no means a simple task. Clark's book, in this regard, can be acclaimed for aiming specifically at bringing into the same fold a focus on the internal strategies of the ICC, as well as national and local levels. Yet his analysis falls short of what such a broad‐sweeping research agenda should entail. To offer a comprehensive insight, indeed, it would be necessary to trace systematically the structure of positions within sites of reception of global justice across national legal and political fields on the African continent. African lawyers, specifically – be they operating at the Court itself, or within national jurisdictions – remain a blind spot in Clark's analysis. However, ongoing research is laying out the hypothesis, precisely, that looking at lawyers, their trajectories, their resources, and their professional strategies can be an invaluable starting point in tracing in the longue durée the unequal and uneven relationship between Africa and the world.2525 See S. Dezalay, ‘Les Juristes en Afrique: Entre Trajectoires d'Etat, Sillons d'Empire et Mondialisation’ (2015) 138 Politique Africaine 5. This could provide a key to moving beyond the ideologically‐laden critique of the ICC as a form of hegemonic intervention or the epitome of the failing promise of universality.

卡夫卡著名的寓言“法律之前”的结论是众所周知的：这位乡下人在没有获得法律援助的情况下死亡。它还为菲尔·克拉克的《遥远的正义》提供了适当的背景。该书的目的是对国际刑事法院（ICC）的政治进行批判性评估，特别关注乌干达和刚果民主共和国（DRC）的案件，并提供有关非洲大陆的更广泛见解。在被指控对非洲大陆有偏见的法院的深刻（显然是棘手的）危机的背景下阅读，这本书特别及时。国际刑事法院成立于1998年，是第一家常设全球法院，负责起诉全世界最严重的罪行-种族灭绝，危害人类罪，战争罪和（自2010年以来）侵略罪。因此，庆祝“纽伦堡遗产”的复兴在整个冷战期间一直处于休眠状态。然而法院2自2002年以来，国际刑事法院仅宣判了三项定罪，其中一项上诉被推翻。自2002年以来，在22宗已完成的案件中，有11宗诉讼失败。四名被告无罪释放。四起案件被驳回。在另外两个案件中，诉讼被放弃。 在更大范围的法院对抗中，无论是美国还是最初对法院有利的国家，从非洲国家本身开始，都没有非洲国家的支持，事实上，国际刑事法院似乎确实存在于被告席上。

克拉克的结论令人沮丧。他将ICC在非洲的失败追溯到一个核心动态：距离。法院与法院所干预的非洲社会之间的物理，机构和人口统计学距离对法院和地方政治均造成了损害”（第17页）。作为伦敦SOAS的国际政治学教授，他对非洲大陆各地的和平，真相，正义与和解进行了长期的，多产的研究，克拉克汇集了大量令人印象深刻的证据来支持他的论文。通过多地点和多层次的方法，在11年的时间里进行了实地调查，对国际刑事法院人员，乌干达高级官员，刚果民主共和国政治和司法官员，民间社会和宗教领袖以及前叛乱战斗人员进行了653次访谈，以及对乌干达和刚果民主共和国日常人员的426次采访–克拉克从本质上记述了国际刑事法院自成立以来的历史。同时，他管理着罕见的壮举，既可以在法院内部也可以在法院外部查看-也就是说，在涉及法院的某些国家/地区中，从国家机构到地方社区对法院的看法国际刑事司法。

该书的主要论点之一是，“国际法院代表外国对非洲事务的一种独特形式，因为它认为与国内领域的距离和分离是一种美德，因为它认为，这保持了法院的中立和公正性”（p 13）。克拉克认为，这源于法院既独立又相互依存的悖论。支撑互补原则的政治，旨在避免主权冲突，这种政治是法院的核心特征，根据该原则，各国负有起诉国际罪行的首要责任和权利。然而，克拉克声称，迄今为止，法院的做法往往以互补性的法律概念为主导，这为各国对其领土内的案件主张管辖权规定了极高的门槛。另一方面，他声称，“距离”“被编码在国际刑事法院的DNA中”（第25页）：与其他外部干预实践不同，该法律确实“将距离视为一种内在美德”（第25页）。 308）。

法院不仅具有物理上和地理上的遥不可及性，而且特意以其作为克拉克批判核心的检察实践为支持的“疏远”倾向，旨在将法律作为超越政治手段的手段。他声称，这将法院的运作嵌入了双重恶果，即将国际刑事法院与国家社会背景隔离开来，并在普遍性的掩盖下编排霸权倾向。克拉克（Clark）辩称，检察官办公室（OTP）的距离政治使法院容易受到国内政治的影响-尤其是在乌干达和刚果（金）等国家，“自我推荐”已成为国内政治的一部分。进一步，法院代表“来自某个地方的观点（西方自由主义），而在那个地方则极具矛盾和适得其反”（第305页）。克拉克认为，距离分离不仅回避了国内司法程序；而且 这也使他认为是促进和平的国家选择，以及最重要的基于社区的正义观和对暴行的回应的观念得到了遏制。

基于这一惨淡的编年史，他将其延伸到对其他非洲局势的调查，克拉克的回应旨在切实可行。他声称，法院需要通过实现“基于政治的法治”或“审慎的政治”（第309页）在政治上有所作为。就是说，它需要从本质上是巡回的，短期的机构中转变出来，这种机构与国家领域的互动（他将其追溯为国际刑事司法程序与国家成果之间的“交汇点”）是由个别案件的司法政治所定义的。 –对于在当地进行投资的机构，其人口统计学意义上是通过具有代表性的非洲员工进行的，并在现场有效地展示，包括在现场进行试验。

克拉克的书进入了现在有关ICC的大量奖学金的范围。它的主要（无可争辩）优点是研究的广泛性和长期性-也就是说，在11年的时间里，无论是在法院本身还是在国家和地方站点，所收集的数据都是巨大的。然而，作为学术干预，克拉克（Clark）也拥护似乎是国际刑事法院辩论的特征：法院朋友与敌人之间的知识战。评论家普遍认为，国际商会与非洲国家之间的“离婚”引发了辩论，这体现了这一点。3见S.Allison，《非洲反抗威胁国际刑事法院的合法性》，《卫报》，2016年10月27日<https://www.theguardian.com/law/2016/oct/27/african-revolt-international-criminal-court-gambia >。 –在2013年10月举行的非洲联盟（AU）特别会议之后，围绕非洲国家集体退出《罗马规约》的威胁而组织–特别是围绕Clark的书进行了讨论。44见P. Labuda和TB Bouwknegt（编辑），``菲尔·克拉克（Phil Clark）远方司法研讨会''，奥皮尼奥·朱里斯（Opinio Juris），2019年9月30日<https://opiniojuris.org/2019/09/30/symposium-on-phil-clarks-distant -justice />。 尽管布隆迪是唯一一个已经有效退出《罗马规约》的国家，但一些评论员很快断言，非盟与国际刑事法院之间被轻描淡写的“烦恼”关系是由于误解和误解而滋生的：因此，他们认为这并非事实从“安理会常任理事国”的角色开始，就如同“撤出”战略一样，是“改革”国际刑事法院的呼声。55见M.Kersten，``三个词如何改变ICC与非洲的关系'' ，《冲突中的正义》，2017年5月9日<https://justiceinconflict.org/2017/05/09/how-three-words-could-change- the-icc-africa-relationship /＃more-7344>。 其他人指出，“非洲”版本的全球司法没有其他可行的选择，因为2014年《马拉博议定书》在非洲司法和人权法院设立刑事庭仍然不太可能生效6。6 15个成员国需要批准该协议。截至2019年7月1日，已有15个州签署，但没有一个国家批准。

尽管对非洲与国际刑事法院之间的分歧轻描淡写，但这些反应仍然倾向于重现新殖民主义形式的全球正义与普遍主义的轮子（尽管生锈）之间的意识形态战线。在这里，克拉克（Clark）通过谴责法院的“霸权主义倾向”（第310页）站在谱系的尽头，而卡尔森（Carlson）等其他人则明确支持包含在国际刑事司法项目中的西方自由主义，目的是“完美”它77 K.卡尔森，《正义的典范：完善国际刑法的承诺》（2018年）。 国际刑事法院的退出是“热带正义……为强者服务的缩影”之间的这种对立88 P.Kipré， 'PROCES巴博点菜CPI：倒入文件所有权等LA正义'青年非洲，2019 1月30日<https://www.jeuneafrique.com/723354/societe/tribune-proces-laurent-gbagbo-a -la-cpi-pour-le-droit-et-la-justice />。作者的翻译是法文。 并呼吁国际刑事法院“专门使用法律的语言” 99 M. Bergsmo， '拉CPI，L'AFFAIRE巴博等乐作用德拉法国'世界报，2019 1月18日<https://www.lemonde.fr/afrique/article/2019/01/18/la-cpi -l-affaire-gbagbo-et-le-role-de-la-france_5410996_3212.html>。作者的翻译是法文。这标志着对国际刑事法院提出批评的极端困难。首先，此类辩论说明了在海牙周围聚集的非常有限的学者和从业者市场中，法院的“封建化”是可以描述的1010参见S. Dezalay，《国际法语学习》？法国国际正义组织（2017）146 Politique Africaine 165。 -据克拉克恰当地认为，法律是距离的“内在美德”（第37页），已成为对抗法院的“政治化”的唯一可用武器。

然而，仅仅“对政治公正”是不够的1111 SMH Nouwen和WG Werner，“为政治伸张正义：乌干达和苏丹的国际刑事法院”（2011年）21欧洲国际法杂志941。通过反对国际刑事法院进行霸权主义努力，反对国家和最重要的社区对暴行的反应的美德。风险在于陷入“重塑”传统的陷阱1212 E. Hobsbawm和T. Ranger（编），《传统的发明》（1983年）。–尽管以帝国主义的批判为幌子。确实，一个愤世嫉俗的观察家可以从克拉克的辩护和客观化中看到乌干达的马托·阿普特这样的当地进程，与殖民者在整个非洲殖民地重塑“习俗”没有什么不同。陷阱在于克拉克形容为“距离”的理论本身。尽管克拉克（Clark）的分析的确打开了ICC作为一个机构的黑匣子，但迄今为止，很少有研究能够成功做到这一点，1313见J. Meierenrich，“国际刑事法院检察官办公室的演变：制度理论的见解”，第一位全球检察官：承诺与约束，M。Minow等编辑。（2015）97。通过追溯OTP的策略和实践，它仍然说明了律师和政治学者在国际法院及其运作上的相互盲目性。“国际法是如此原始，以至于对我们来说它就是法律，但对其他国家而言，这只是其中的一种选择。” 1414 2012年11月8日，作者对多伦多的路易斯·莫雷诺·奥坎波的采访（罗恩·列维）。国际刑事法院第一任检察官路易斯·莫雷诺·奥坎波（Luis Moreno Ocampo）的这份独断评论反映了正在进行的有关国际刑事法院辩论的压倒性趋势，即对司法机构的国际刑事法院采取狭，的，功能主义的观点。因此，“正义通常仍然是一种背景，一种被视为既定的制度，其（法律）形式是静态的，并且（其合法性）其效果是平等的。” 1515 A. Vauchez，“正义政治研究所”，2006年第63-64页Droit etSociété491 ，第493页。作者译自法文。展开：克拉克（Clark）认为国内法院是“可以说最像国际刑事法院”的机构（第150页）。然而，这表明对法院的误解-它不是国内法院的一个巨大版本-以及距离概念应包含的内容。

确实，法律和政治之间的明确表达需要反馈到辩论中：作为宪法和国家国家权力合法化的核心驱动力-正如皮埃尔·布尔迪厄（Pierre Bourdieu）在死后的《苏尔特》（Sur l'État） 16中所追溯的那样。16 P. Bourdieu，Sur l'état：法国库尔斯大学（1989-1992）（2012）。–在国际结构中，既是国家利益预测的舞台，也是政治合法化制度化的舞台。因此，距离是法律的基因，但它反映了法律与政治之间不断的紧张关系或双重约束。Kantorowicz17开辟的研究道路17 E. Kantorowicz，《Le Deux Corps du Roi》（1989年）。 他的其他观点表明，律师在结构上可以玩“双重游戏”。1818见Y.Dezalay和BG Garth，``国家政治与法律市场''（2011年）10比较社会学38。 在为权力持有人服务时（从而在国家权力的合法化中发挥着核心作用），律师还需要与政治保持距离，以保护法律的自主权及其职业实践。

另一方面，当然，国际刑事法院的职责本身（使它能够在持续冲突的背景下发起起诉，不仅可以事后而且可以事前执行“实时”司法），加剧了人们认为的分裂正义和政治之间的两个对立目标。然而，这些反对意见也突显了国际刑事司法在政治上的结构性嵌入，是一个“薄弱领域”，也就是说，就其内部自治而言，这个空间是薄弱的，但在更广泛的社会影响方面却不是薄弱的。1919 S.Dezalay，“国际刑事法院运作中的常规缺陷”（2016年）17国际刑法修订版。281。从这个意义上讲，检察官办公室的结构本身-其管辖权，互补性与合作司专门设计成与外交环境和国际非政府组织（INGO）在法庭周围的交往-反映了双重战略。 1990年代以来国际刑事法庭通过增生采取的生存2020例如，除了根据先前国际刑事法庭的经验制定的判例法之外，国际刑事法院的起诉战略在很大程度上依赖于这些先例（约三分之一的人员来自特设法庭）。参见S. Dezalay，同前。cit。，n。19 和制度转换2121见H.Schoenfeld等人，《国际刑事法庭刑事诉讼制度》（CrisesExtrêmeset Institutionnalisation du DroitPénalInternational）（2007年）36 Critique Internationale 37。 旨在应对嵌入其中的``非典型政治环境''的特定特征22。22 R.Levi等人，``非典型政治环境中的国际法院：国际刑法中检察策略，证据和法院权力的相互作用''（2016年）78法律与当代问题289。

首先，距离的分离实际上是法律的固有特征，但作为构成国家政治斗争的舞台的国际结构的组成部分，也凸显了国际刑事司法是一种“象征性的”市场–即利用布迪厄的思考，2323 P.Bourdieu，《 LeMarchédes Biens Symboliques》（1971年）22 L' AnnéeSociologique 49。相信全球正义是一种象征性物品的空间是全球正义机构权威的条件。当然，这是一个竞争异常激烈的市场。ICC构成了弥漫性的“改革常识” 24最突出的制度化维度24 C.托帕洛夫（主编），塞维尔国家实验室：法国新星和新世纪（1880–1914）（1999）。关于在全球范围内将国家和武装暴力定为刑事犯罪，但它在全球范围内运作，对此类罪行的司法对策仍然受到质疑，支离破碎和不平衡。然而，至关重要的是，将国际刑事司法作为一个象征性市场，这表明生产者的受限制市场与全球司法用户的广泛市场之间存在动态关系。仅查看这一空间的一端（无论是由国际刑事法院为国际法院产生的话语，还是法院竞争者的话语）最多只能部分阐明该空间的运作方式。这强调了有必要逐步了解国际刑事法院内部，竞争性国际空间中将某些行为定为刑事犯罪的立场结构，以及全球北部和全球南部国家权力的国家领域，以及追踪这些国家和国际空间之间动态关系的过程。这绝不是简单的任务。在这方面，克拉克的书之所以广受赞誉，是因为它专门针对国际刑事法院的内部战略，以及国家和地方各级，进行了同样的论述。然而，他的分析未能满足如此广泛的研究议程的要求。实际上，为了提供全面的见解，有必要系统地追踪非洲大陆国家法律和政治领域中接受全球正义的地点内的职位结构。特别是非洲律师-无论是在法院本身还是在国家管辖范围内运作-仍然是克拉克分析中的盲点。但是，正在进行的研究正在准确地提出这一假设，25世界和非洲之间不平等和不平衡的关系。25见S.Dezalay，``非洲法学家：Etat的Entre Trajectoires d'Empire和Mondialisation''（2015年）138 Politique Africaine 5。 这可以提供一个超越意识形态的批评，作为一种霸权主义干预手段或对普遍性的失败承诺的缩影来超越ICC的关键。