Accountability is a key concern for international standard setters. If transnational actors set standards instead of national democratic authorities, then the standard setters might suffer from ‘apparent’ deficits in their democratic accountability and oversight. Consequently, most international standard setters rely on different processes to enhance their accountability and transparency to mitigate concerns about their own standards. Ensuring accountability is already a major challenge for a single or homogenous set of rules or standards. So how can a supranational body design legitimate rules that rest on the standards of another very different supranational standard setter? This study examines the accountability and transparency concerns from the interaction of supranational standard setters that have different objectives. Therefore, I investigate the processes of prudential regulation based on the capital adequacy standard of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision that relies on the financial accounting standards set by the International Accounting Standards Board. The results show flaws with respect to accountability in the regulatory process that involves another standard setter and how the prudential regulator reacts to these flaws to ensure a higher degree of accountability in its banking regulation.

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巴塞尔和 IASB：审慎监管的问责制相互依存关系和后果

问责制是国际标准制定者的主要关注点。如果跨国行为者而不是国家民主当局制定标准，那么标准制定者在民主问责制和监督方面可能会“明显”存在缺陷。因此，大多数国际标准制定者依靠不同的流程来增强其问责制和透明度，以减轻对其自身标准的担忧。对于单一或同质的规则或标准，确保问责制已经是一项重大挑战。那么，一个超国家机构如何设计出基于另一个截然不同的超国家标准制定者的标准的合法规则呢？本研究考察了具有不同目标的超国家标准制定者之间相互作用的问责制和透明度问题。所以，我调查了基于巴塞尔银行监管委员会资本充足率标准的审慎监管过程，该标准依赖于国际会计准则委员会制定的财务会计标准。结果表明，涉及另一位标准制定者的监管过程中的问责制存在缺陷，以及审慎监管机构如何应对这些缺陷以确保其银行业监管具有更高程度的问责制。