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Defining Hate Speech
Journal of International Criminal Justice ( IF 0.753 ) Pub Date : 2020-03-01 , DOI: 10.1093/jicj/mqaa023
Audrey Fino 1
Affiliation  

This article looks at the international criminal law on hate speech that falls short of direct and public incitement to commit genocide. Using the most egregious form of hate speech that has been prosecuted as an international crime — that of direct and public incitement to genocide — as a baseline, the author analyses the legal parameters of hate speech as persecution (a crime against humanity) and hate speech as instigation (a mode of liability). In so doing, the author critically reviews the International Residual Mechanism for the International Criminal Tribunals’ (IRMCT) appeal judgment in the Seselj case (Seselj Appeal Judgment) in the light of prior case law of the International Military Tribunal of Nuremberg (IMT) and the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia (ICTR and ICTY respectively). The author submits that a plain reading of the Seselj Appeal Judgment supports the view that it is only the more extreme form of incitement to violence, incitement to commit crimes, followed by actual violent acts, that may constitute hate speech amounting to the crime of persecution: incitement to discrimination or incitement to hatred as such do not qualify. Whether ‘incitement to violence’ absent the commission of crimes could qualify as persecution (a crime against humanity) remains an unsettled point. With regard to hate speech as instigation, the Seselj Appeal Judgment’s restatement and application of the law causes less controversy: the substantial causal connection required for instigation was found to be direct in the circumstances of that case — even though directness is not a legal requirement for instigation. The author concludes that both these interpretations of hate speech are consistent with the earlier ad hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence and, more generally, with international human rights law which, with some controversial exceptions, allows criminalization only of the most extreme forms of incitement to violence

中文翻译:

定义仇恨言论

本文着眼于关于仇恨言论的国际刑法,这些言论不属于直接和公开煽动实施种族灭绝的行为。以被起诉为国际罪行的最恶劣形式的仇恨言论——直接和公开煽动种族灭绝——为基准,作者分析了作为迫害(危害人类罪)和仇恨言论的仇恨言论的法律参数作为煽动(一种责任模式)。在此过程中,作者根据纽伦堡国际军事法庭 (IMT) 的先前判例法批判性地审查了国际刑事法庭 (IRMCT) 对 Seselj 案的上诉判决 (Seselj Appeal Judgment) 和卢旺达问题国际刑事法庭和前南斯拉夫问题国际刑事法庭(分别是 ICTR 和 ICTY)。提交人提出,对 Seselj 上诉判决的简单解读支持以下观点,即只有更极端的煽动暴力、煽动犯罪,然后是实际的暴力行为,才可能构成构成迫害罪的仇恨言论:煽动歧视或煽动仇恨本身不符合条件。在没有犯罪的情况下,“煽动暴力”是否可以构成迫害(危害人类罪)仍然是一个悬而未决的问题。关于作为煽动的仇恨言论,Seselj 上诉判决对法律的重述和适用引起的争议较少:在该案的情况下,煽动所需的实质性因果关系被认为是直接的——即使直接性不是煽动。
更新日期:2020-03-01
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