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Jump bids in real estate auctions
Journal of Housing Economics ( IF 2.268 ) Pub Date : 2020-07-06 , DOI: 10.1016/j.jhe.2020.101713
Dag Einar Sommervoll

The lion’s share of Norwegian homes changes hands through closely monitored and regulated auctions. Some housing market experts advocate the supremacy of a jump bid, a significant bid increase to discourage fellow bidders, and thereby acquire the dwelling at a lower price compared to bidding strategy with moderate bid increases. We find no evidence for the efficacy of this jump bid strategy. Jump bidders, if successful, pay a positive jump premium. This also applies to the case where the jump is not the final bid and the jump bidder win at a later stage. In this case, the jump bid premium is around 1 to 2%. However, a jump bid is a credible signal of “serious intentions”. Jump bidders tend to win auction more often even in cases, where the jump bid is matched, and the auction continues.



中文翻译:

在房地产拍卖中提高出价

通过密切监控和规范的拍卖,挪威房屋的最大份额易手。一些住房市场专家主张采用跳高竞标,即大幅提高竞标价格以阻止其他竞标者,从而与中等竞标价格的竞标策略相比,以较低的价格购得该住宅。我们没有证据表明这种跳票策略的有效性。跳跃竞标者,如果成功,则支付正跳跃溢价。这也适用于跳跃不是最终出价并且跳跃竞标者在稍后阶段获胜的情况。在这种情况下,跳高出价溢价约为1%至2%。但是,跳票是“严重意图”的可靠信号。即使在跳票匹配且拍卖继续的情况下,跳票竞标者也往往会更经常赢得拍卖。

更新日期:2020-07-06
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