The issue of Student Evaluation of Teaching has been explored by a large literature across many decades. However, the role of social influence factors in determining teachers’ responses to a given incentive and evaluation framework has been left basically unexplored. This paper makes a first attempt in this vein by considering an evolutionary game-theoretic context where teachers face a two-stage process in which their rating depends on both students’ evaluation of their course and on retrospective students’ evaluation of their teaching output in view of students’ performance in a related follow-up course. We find that both high effort (difficult course offered) and low effort (easy course offered) outcomes may emerge, leading either to a socially optimal outcome for teachers or not, according to cases. Moreover, there may be a potential conflict between the optimal outcome for students and for teachers. We also consider possible ways to generalize our model in future research.

几十年来，大量文献探讨了学生对教学评价的问题。但是，社会影响因素在确定教师对给定的激励和评估框架的反应中的作用尚未得到充分探讨。为此，本文通过考虑演化博弈论的背景进行了首次尝试，在这种情况下，教师面临两个阶段的过程，即他们的评分取决于学生对课程的评价以及回顾性学生对教学成果的评价。学生在相关后续课程中的表现。我们发现，根据情况，可能会出现高强度（提供困难的课程）和低强度（提供简易课程）的结果，从而导致教师对社会的最佳结果与否。此外，学生和老师的最佳成绩之间可能存在潜在的冲突。我们还考虑了在未来研究中推广模型的可能方法。