This article studies the evolutionarily stable equilibria of one-manufacturer and one-retailer supply chains. Each agent chooses to be either shareholder-oriented or stakeholder-oriented based on its own preference, then gives its pricing decision. Supply chains are formed by two types of matching processes: uniform random matching and assortative matching. Results indicate that, under uniform random matching, only one evolutionarily stable equilibrium exists, namely, the strict Nash equilibrium where both manufacturer and retailer choose shareholder strategy. Under assortative matching, the strict Nash equilibrium may not be evolutionarily stable under sign-compatible dynamics. The equilibrium where both manufacturer and retailer choose stakeholder strategy may be evolutionarily stable for certain values of the indices of assortativity. Furthermore, an interior equilibrium is observed with assortative matching, and the boundary equilibrium may be an evolutionarily stable equilibrium in some special cases.

本文研究了一个制造商和一个零售商的供应链的演化稳定均衡。每个代理商根据自己的偏好选择是以股东为导向还是以股东为导向，然后做出定价决定。供应链由两种匹配过程组成：统一随机匹配和分类匹配。结果表明，在统一随机匹配下，仅存在一个进化稳定的均衡，即严格的纳什均衡，制造商和零售商均选择股东策略。在分类匹配下，严格的Nash平衡在符号兼容动力学下可能不是进化稳定的。对于分类指数的某些值，制造商和零售商都选择利益相关者策略的均衡可能在进化上是稳定的。