当前位置: X-MOL 学术Journal of Economic Psychology › 论文详情
Our official English website, www.x-mol.net, welcomes your feedback! (Note: you will need to create a separate account there.)
Out-of-pocket vs. out-of-investment in financial advisory fees: Evidence from the lab
Journal of Economic Psychology ( IF 3.000 ) Pub Date : 2020-09-19 , DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2020.102317
Yevgeny Mugerman , Orly Sade , Eyal Winter

The implications of the method of payment to financial advisors on the behavior of individuals are of interest to economists and regulators around the globe. This paper uses an experimental approach to compare two common alternative forms of payment. The first is “out-of-pocket” (an upfront payment from a checking account), and the second is “out-of-investment” (a deferred payment from an investment portfolio account). We document that for the same financial advice, the subjects in the first treatment were willing to pay on average 25 per cent less than the subjects in the second treatment – payment following an investment outcome knowledge, where the payment was framed in terms of gains. We introduce an additional out-of-pocket payment structure where the actual payment is deferred until after the subject discovers the outcome of the investment. Thus, the design can be broken down into two distinct possible effects, an out-of-pocket vs. out-of-investment framing effect and a pre-outcome vs. post-outcome timing effect. We find that the timing effect is the key element: across out-of-pocket payment structures, the subjects were willing to pay significantly less in the pre-outcome treatment than their counterparts were in the post-outcome treatment. Our results highlight the difference between post-service and pre-service payments in a broader context, and provide an explanation for why allowing late payment, after the service has been performed and its outcome revealed, may increase the ex-ante willingness to pay for the service.



中文翻译:

财务顾问费的自付费用与投资不足:来自实验室的证据

对于全球的经济学家和监管机构来说,向财务顾问支付费用对个人行为的影响是有意义的。本文采用实验方法来比较两种常见的替代付款方式。第一个是“自付费用”(来自支票帐户的预付款),第二个是“投资不足”(从投资组合帐户中递延的付款)。我们记录到,对于相同的财务建议,第一种治疗的受试者比第二种治疗的受试者愿意平均少支付25%的费用-根据投资结果知识进行的付款,该付款是以收益为框架的。我们引入了一种额外的自付费用结构,在该结构中,实际付款被推迟到主题发现投资结果之后。因此,可以将设计分解为两种不同的可能效果:自付费用与投资不足的框架效果以及事前与事后时序影响。我们发现,时间效应是关键因素:在自付费用结构中,受试者愿意在结果治疗前比在结果治疗后显着减少支付。我们的结果突显了在更广泛的背景下离职后付款与离职前付款之间的区别,并解释了为什么在执行服务并显示其结果后允许延迟付款可能会增加事前付款的意愿。服务。结果后时间效应。我们发现,时间效应是关键因素:在自付费用结构中,受试者愿意在结果治疗前比在结果治疗后显着减少支付。我们的结果突显了在更广泛的背景下离职后付款与离职前付款之间的区别,并解释了为什么在执行服务并显示其结果后允许延迟付款可能会增加事前付款的意愿。服务。结果后时间效应。我们发现,时间效应是关键因素:在自付费用结构中,受试者愿意在结果治疗前比在结果治疗后显着减少支付。我们的结果突显了在更广泛的背景下离职后付款与离职前付款之间的区别,并解释了为什么在执行服务并显示其结果后允许延迟付款可能会增加事前付款的意愿。服务。

更新日期:2020-09-19
down
wechat
bug