ABSTRACT

This article examines the empirical incidence of the private and public enforcement of disclosure laws in Australia. Disclosure laws aim to ensure the reduction of information asymmetries and the accuracy of share prices, but their success is predicated on enforcement. In order to assess the enforcement landscape, this article presents two new disclosure law action datasets comprising both private and public enforcement for further examination. In light of these findings, this article addresses the question of whether the Australian system of enforcement is effective, by reference to whether the enforcement actions compensate, deter, and signal. Overall, the empirical analysis confirms the signalling function of enforcement, shows that there is likely to be a reasonable degree of deterrence where directors are targeted, however, that the compensation rationale is not met. This results in a moderately effective enforcement framework with notable room for improvement across both modalities of enforcement.

抽象的

本文研究了澳大利亚的私人和公共执行披露法律的实证事件。披露法律旨在确保减少信息不对称和股价准确性，但其成功取决于执法。为了评估执法情况，本文提出了两个新的披露法律诉讼数据集，包括私人执法和公共执法，以供进一步研究。根据这些发现，本文通过参考执法行动是否能够补偿，威慑和发出信号，来解决澳大利亚执法系统是否有效的问题。总体而言，经验分析证实了执法的信号功能，表明以董事为目标的威慑力可能存在合理程度，但是，补偿理由未得到满足。这样就形成了一个适度有效的执法框架，在两种执法方式上都有显着改善的余地。