ABSTRACT

The UK was the first country to introduce so-called ‘say on pay’ regulation in 2002, by providing shareholders with an advisory vote on the Directors’ Remuneration Report. That approach recognised that disclosure alone was not an adequate regulatory response to the widening gap between directors’ pay and company performance nor to the broader political concern over the implications of this trend for social solidarity. A second stage in the evolution of the regime began in 2013 when shareholders were granted a binding vote on remuneration policy. In this article we present the results of the first longitudinal survey of the entire phase of ‘say on pay’ regulation in the UK to date. We examine the link between each stage of ‘say on pay’ regulation and the level and growth of directors’ remuneration. We conclude by linking our empirical evidence to broader developments in shareholder engagement with listed companies.

摘要

英国是2002年通过向股东提供关于董事薪酬报告的咨询性投票的第一个引入所谓的“有偿说法”法规的国家。这种方法认识到，仅披露是对董事薪酬与公司绩效之间差距不断扩大的充分监管反应，也不是对这种趋势对社会团结的影响所引起的更广泛的政治关注。该制度发展的第二阶段始于2013年，当时股东获得了关于薪酬政策的有约束力的投票。在本文中，我们介绍了迄今为止对英国“有偿说法”监管整个阶段的第一次纵向调查的结果。我们研究了“薪酬论”监管的各个阶段与董事薪酬水平和增长之间的联系。