How does the introduction of tied labour or a saving product affect labour market decisions and wages in rural agricultural labour markets? We develop a theoretical model of labour tying that incorporates diminishing marginal returns to consumption and inequality (behindness) aversion in the context of a rural agricultural labour market with seasonally fluctuating demand for labour, and test model predictions using a framed field experiment (modified ultimatum game) in rural Uganda. Our main findings are that (1) wages fluctuate with productivity, (2) access to tied contracts decreases wages for casual labour and (3) access to a saving technology does not improve wages for tied labour. Consistent with model predictions and earlier theory, we empirically find that income for workers goes down (and income for landlords goes up) if an institutional innovation enables consumption smoothing by workers (tied contracts or a saving technology).

中文翻译：

---

固定劳动、储蓄和农村劳动力市场工资：来自框架现场实验的证据

捆绑劳动力或储蓄产品的引入如何影响农村农业劳动力市场的劳动力市场决策和工资？我们开发了一种劳动力捆绑的理论模型，该模型在劳动力需求季节性波动的农村农业劳动力市场的背景下结合了消费边际收益递减和不平等（落后）厌恶，并使用框架式现场实验（修改后的最后通牒博弈）测试模型预测) 在乌干达农村。我们的主要发现是：(1) 工资随生产率波动，​​(2) 获得捆绑合同会降低临时工的工资，(3) 获得储蓄技术不会提高捆绑劳工的工资。与模型预测和早期理论一致，