This paper assesses the effect of the attempt by an incumbent to amend the section of the constitution related to the presidential term limits on fiscal policy. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that the process of modifying the constitution to run for a third term leads the incumbent to increase government spending as a tool for political patronage. Using a sample of 30 African countries over the period 1990–2010, our findings indicate an increase in government spending during the term in which the constitution was amended. In addition, we find evidence of the exacerbation of the political budget cycle during periods of expansion. However, this effect is not robust to alternative estimation strategies, including matching techniques. From the policy perspective, this study suggests that it is worth watching out not only for elections but also for constitutional changes that are a catalyst of fiscal indiscipline and can further weaken institutions that are positively correlated with countercyclical fiscal policies.

中文翻译：

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非洲国家的总统任期限制和财政政策†

本文评估了现任总统试图修改宪法中与总统任期限制有关的财政政策部分的影响。具体而言，我们检验了这样一个假设，即修改宪法以连任第三届的过程会导致现任者增加政府支出，以此作为政治赞助的工具。使用 1990 年至 2010 年期间 30 个非洲国家的样本，我们的调查结果表明，在修改宪法期间政府支出有所增加。此外，我们发现了扩张时期政治预算周期恶化的证据。然而，这种影响对于替代估计策略（包括匹配技术）并不稳健。从政策上看，