While studies have sought to explain the benefits of cross-listing, little attention has been paid to the role of communication between managers and investors during this process. In this paper, I investigate whether managers change communication policies around U.S. cross-listings. I document significant increases in communication when firms cross-list. I then test whether these investor communication practices around cross-listing are associated with capital market benefits. I find that cross-listed firms that communicate more with investors experience greater and longer lasting cross-listing benefits. Lastly, I explore two potential reasons that may lead managers to choose higher levels of communication: to support an increase in investor recognition and to facilitate monitoring. I find results consistent with communication increasing visibility and scrutiny, suggesting that communication functions as a supporting tool to achieve managers’ cross-listing goals.

尽管研究试图解释交叉上市的好处，但在此过程中，管理者与投资者之间的沟通作用却很少受到关注。在本文中，我研究了经理们是否改变了围绕美国交叉上市的沟通政策。我记录了公司交叉列出后沟通的显着增加。然后，我测试围绕交叉上市的这些投资者交流实践是否与资本市场收益相关联。我发现与投资者进行更多交流的交叉上市公司会获得更大和更持久的交叉上市收益。最后，我探讨了可能导致管理者选择更高层次的沟通的两个潜在原因：支持增加投资者的认可度并促进监控。