We examine drivers and consequences of U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) oversight of whistleblower cases of corporate fraud against the government. We find that the DOJ is more likely to intervene in and conduct longer investigations of cases that have a higher chance of victory and yield greater monetary proceeds, indicating that DOJ enforcement is influenced by its performance measures. DOJ intervention also affects the firm- and aggregate-level fraud environment. Firms subject to DOJ intervention improve their employee relations, internal controls, and board independence, and experience lower future whistleblowing risk. Whistleblowers avoid courts and agencies with low DOJ intervention rates. In contrast, we do not find that cases pursued by whistleblowers alone affect firms' or whistleblowers' behavior, suggesting that public enforcement through DOJ intervention has a greater deterrent effect on fraud than private enforcement by whistleblowers acting alone.

我们研究了美国司法部（DOJ）监督举报公司针对政府进行欺诈的案件的驱动因素和后果。我们发现，司法部更有可能对获胜机会更高且产生更多金钱收益的案件进行干预，并进行更长的调查，这表明司法部的执行受到其绩效指标的影响。司法部的干预也会影响公司和集体层面的欺诈环境。受司法部干预的公司改善了员工关系，内部控制和董事会独立性，并降低了未来的举报风险。告密者应避免DOJ干预率较低的法院和机构。相比之下，我们没有发现仅举报人提起的案件会影响公司或举报人的行为，