This paper uses lab-in-the-field experiments and theory to explore why people give money to governments. We assume that giving is motivated by outcome–oriented or consequentialist norms, and conditional on (a) others’ behavior and (b) beliefs about how competent the government is. The evidence from a lab experiment in Peru is in line with this. On the other hand, we analyze the potential effects of two policies to increase giving, observing that less people give zero if they are informed about (i) two specific government projects (a subway line and a children’s hospital) or (ii) that some well-known Olympic medalist pays punctually her taxes, according to public information released by the Peruvian tax Agency. Our findings contribute to a burgeoning literature on tax morale and are arguably relevant to understand taxpayers’ non-selfish reasons to pay (or evade) their taxes.

本文使用现场实验室的实验和理论来探讨人们为什么向政府捐钱。我们假设捐赠是出于以结果为导向或因果主义的规范所驱动，并以（a）他人的行为和（b）对政府能力的信念为条件。秘鲁实验室实验的证据与此相符。另一方面，我们分析了两项增加捐赠的政策的潜在影响，并观察到如果人们了解（i）两个特定的政府项目（地铁和儿童医院）或（ii）一些根据秘鲁税务局发布的公开信息，著名的奥运奖牌获得者按时缴纳了税款。