In a companion article published in the preceding issue of this journal, “The Right to Freedom of Religion and the Right against Religious Discrimination: Theoretical Distinctions,” we focused on the theoretical differences between the right to freedom of religion and the right against religious discrimination. We explained that the right to freedom of religion is best understood as protecting our interest in religious adherence (and non-adherence), understood from the committed perspective of the (non)adherent. On the other hand, the right against religious discrimination is best understood as protecting our non-committal interest in the unsaddled membership of our religious group. This follow-up article builds upon these theoretical insights to show how key doctrinal implications follow from this distinction between our interest in religious (non)adherence and our interest in unsaddled membership of a religious group. Doctrinal implications arise for the respective scope of the two rights, whether they may be claimed against non-state actors, and their divergent tolerance levels for religious establishment. We explain that these theoretical distinctions imply that the scope of religious freedom is extremely broad, whereas that of religious antidiscrimination is relatively narrow. Moreover, religious freedom should be restricted as a claim solely against the state (or, possibly, other state-like bodies), whereas a claim of religious discrimination may be permitted against certain non-state actors as well. Third, we demonstrate that certain forms of religious establishment, and other non-zero-sum benefits to particular religious groups, breach the antidiscrimination guarantee but not (necessarily) the religious freedom guarantee. In the final section of this article, we map the areas of overlap between the two rights and identify cases where one of these rights might be engaged but not the other.

中文翻译：

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人权法中的宗教：规范性重述

在本刊前一期发表的一篇配套文章“宗教自由权与反对宗教歧视权：理论区别”中，我们重点讨论了宗教自由权与反对宗教歧视权之间的理论差异. 我们解释说，最好将宗教自由权理解为保护我们对宗教信仰（和不信仰）的兴趣，从（非）信仰者的信仰角度来理解。另一方面，反对宗教歧视的权利最好理解为保护我们在我们宗教团体的无鞍成员中的非承诺利益。这篇后续文章建立在这些理论见解的基础上，以展示我们对宗教（非）依从的兴趣和我们对宗教团体无鞍成员的兴趣之间的这种区别如何产生关键的教义含义。这两项权利的各自范围产生了教义影响，是否可以针对非国家行为者提出索赔，以及它们对宗教机构的不同容忍程度。我们解释说，这些理论上的区别意味着宗教自由的范围极其广泛，而宗教反歧视的范围则相对狭窄。此外，宗教自由应被限制为仅针对国家（或其他类似国家的机构）的主张，而针对某些非国家行为者的宗教歧视主张也可能被允许。第三，我们证明，某些形式的宗教机构，以及对特定宗教团体的其他非零和利益，违反了反歧视保证，但不（必然）违反了宗教自由保证。在本文的最后一部分，我们绘制了两种权利之间的重叠区域，并确定可能涉及其中一种权利但不涉及另一种权利的情况。