We study global games with strategic substitutes. Specifically, for a class of binary‐action, ‐player games with strategic substitutes, we prove that under payoff asymmetry, as incomplete information vanishes, the global games approach selects a unique equilibrium. We characterize this equilibrium profile ; players employ switching strategies at different cutoff signals, the order of which is directly determined by payoff asymmetry. We provide examples that illustrate our result and its connection with dominance solvability. We extend the global game literature, which has thus far been developed for games with strategic complementarities, to new applications in industrial organization, collective action problems, finance, etc .

中文翻译：

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具有战略替补的全球游戏

我们研究具有战略替代品的全球游戏。具体来说，对于具有战略替代品的一类二元玩家游戏，我们证明在收益不对称下，随着不完全信息消失，全局博弈方法选择了唯一的均衡。我们刻画了这种平衡轮廓; 参与者在不同的截止信号处采用切换策略，其顺序直接由收益不对称性决定。我们提供了一些例子来说明我们的结果及其与优势可解性的关系。我们将迄今为止为具有战略互补性的游戏而开发的全球游戏文献扩展到产业组织，集体行动问题，金融等方面的新应用。