The relevance of special interests lobbying in modern democracies can hardly be questioned. But if large trade associations can overcome the free riding problem and form effective lobbies, why do they not also threaten market competition by forming equally effective cartels? We argue that the key to understanding the difference lies in supply elasticity. The group discipline, which works in the case of lobbying, can be effective in sustaining a cartel only if increasing output is sufficiently costly—otherwise the incentive to deviate is too great. The theory helps organizing a number of stylized facts within a common framework.

中文翻译：

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贸易协会：为什么不选择卡特尔？

几乎没有人质疑在现代民主国家游说特殊利益的相关性。但是，如果大型贸易协会可以克服搭便车问题并形成有效的游说组织，为什么它们不通过组建同样有效的卡特尔来威胁市场竞争呢？我们认为理解差异的关键在于供应弹性。在游说的情况下起作用的集体纪律，只有在增加产出足够昂贵的情况下才能有效地维持卡特尔，否则，偏离的动机就太大了。该理论有助于在一个通用框架内组织许多风格化的事实。