We study the role of communication in collusive market sharing. In a series of Cournot oligopoly experiments with multiple markets, we vary the information that firms can exchange: hard information—verifiable information about past conduct—and soft information—unbinding information about future conduct. We find that the effect of communication on the firms' ability to collude depends on the type of information available: Whereas market prices increase only slightly with hard information, the price raise due to soft information is substantial. Our results point to the types and contents of communication that should be of particular concern to antitrust authorities.

中文翻译：

---

通讯和市场共享：软硬信息交换的实验

我们研究了沟通在共谋市场共享中的作用。在针对多个市场的一系列古诺寡头实验中，我们改变了公司可以交换的信息：硬信息（关于过去行为的可验证信息）和软信息（关于未来行为的约束力）。我们发现，交流对企业共谋能力的影响取决于可用信息的类型：尽管市场价格在硬信息下仅略有上涨，但软信息导致的价格上涨却是可观的。我们的结果指出了反托拉斯当局应该特别关注的沟通类型和内容。