This article develops an understanding of human rights courts as ‘norm brokers’. We regard ‘norm-brokering’ as an exegetic method of judicial reasoning, ultimately concerned with reason-giving and the quality of justification. It entails robust engagement with alternative norms raised in the course of human rights adjudication. Norm-brokering thus involves much more than the mere cataloguing of alternative norms—and, at a minimum, a methodical approach to the question of normative harmonization. We suggest that the process of norm-brokering contributes to ‘public reason’ by enhancing the intelligibility of judgments. This, in turn, helps confound legitimacy-based critiques of human rights courts. The argument is supported by an analysis of 10 years’ worth of European Court of Human Rights judgments, focusing on the ways in which norms from the Inter-American human rights system are relied upon (or not) by the Strasbourg Court.

中文翻译：

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作为规范经纪人的人权法院

本文将人权法院理解为“规范经纪人”。我们将“规范中介”视为司法推理的一种解释方法，最终与给出理由和辩护的质量有关。它需要大力参与在人权裁决过程中提出的替代规范。因此，规范中介涉及的不仅仅是对替代规范的编目——而且至少是规范协调问题的一种有条不紊的方法。我们建议规范中介的过程通过增强判断的可理解性来促进“公共理性”。这反过来又有助于混淆对人权法院基于合法性的批评。该论点得到了对欧洲人权法院 10 年判决价值的分析的支持，