On 2 October 2018, Jamal Khashoggi, a dissident Saudi journalist residing in the United States, where he was a columnist for the Washington Post, was murdered in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul. This article seeks to comprehensively analyze Khashoggi’s killing from the standpoint of the human right to life. It sets out the relevant legal framework, addressing inter alia the issue that Saudi Arabia is not a party to what would otherwise be the most relevant human rights treaty, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. It examines not only the obligations of Saudi Arabia, but also those of Turkey and the United States, in protecting Khashoggi’s right to life from third parties, and ensuring respect through an effective investigation of his killing and mutual cooperation for the purpose of that investigation. It also looks at the extraterritorial scope of these various obligations.Finally, the article examines possible norm conflicts between state obligations under human rights law and their obligations under diplomatic and consular law, such as the inviolability of diplomatic and consular premises, agents, and means of transportation. The article argues that the fundamentals of the operation of the right to life in its various aspects regarding Khashoggi are reasonably clear. First, before the killing, the positive duty to protect Khashoggi’s life was triggered if Turkey and the United States knew, or ought to have known, of a real and immediate risk to Khashoggi’s life. It seems possible, if not likely, that these two states, and potentially others as well, did in fact possess such information so that the threat to Khashoggi’s life was reasonably foreseeable to them. If such was the case, at the very minimum these states had the duty to warn Khashoggi of the threat, which they did not do. Second, there is no doubt that Saudi Arabia was in flagrant violation of the negative obligation to refrain from arbitrary deprivations of life. As for Turkey, if it knew, or ought to have known, of the threat to Khashoggi’s life in the premises of the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, it would have been required by its obligation to protect his life to forcibly enter the consulate if that was the only way of saving his life. Third, Khashoggi’s killing engaged the procedural positive obligation to investigate his death. The article shows that many of the decisions that Turkey had made which compromised the effectiveness of the investigation, but which Turkey claimed it had to pursue in order to respect consular privileges and immunities, were in fact not required by consular law. For example, no rule of international law required Turkey to allow the Saudi agents to leave the country, to allow the consul-general and other members of consular staff to leave the country, or to ask Saudi Arabia for consent to search the consul-general’s residence or the consulate’s vehicles. The article concludes that regardless of whether accountability for Khashoggi’s killing is ever fully realized, this does not change the fact that his right to life was protected by international law, as was the right to life of countless other victims of authoritarian regimes worldwide. The murder was a violation of the rights Khashoggi himself had had under international law, not simply those of the Turkish state. It deserves to be discussed in those terms.

中文翻译：

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Jamal Khashoggi 谋杀案：豁免权、不可侵犯性和生命权

2018 年 10 月 2 日，居住在美国的持不同政见的沙特记者贾马尔·卡舒吉（Jamal Khashoggi）在沙特驻伊斯坦布尔领事馆被谋杀，他是华盛顿邮报的专栏作家。本文试图从人权生命权的角度全面分析卡舒吉之死。它规定了相关的法律框架，除其他外，解决了沙特阿拉伯不是最相关的人权条约《公民权利和政治权利国际公约》的缔约方的问题。它不仅审查了沙特阿拉伯的义务，还审查了土耳其和美国在保护 Khashoggi 的生命权免受第三方侵害方面的义务，并通过有效调查他的杀戮和为调查目的的相互合作来确保尊重。它还考察了这些不同义务的域外范围。 最后，本文考察了国家在人权法下的义务与其在外交和领事法下的义务之间可能存在的规范冲突，例如外交和领事馆舍、代理人和手段的不可侵犯性。的运输。文章认为，关于 Khashoggi 的生命权运作的各个方面的基本原理是相当清楚的。首先，在被杀之前，如果土耳其和美国知道或应该知道卡舒吉的生命面临真实和直接的风险，就会触发保护卡舒吉生命的积极义务。似乎有可能，如果不太可能，这两种状态，以及可能的其他状态，事实上，他们确实掌握了这些信息，因此他们可以合理地预见到对卡舒吉生命的威胁。如果是这样的话，这些州至少有义务警告卡舒吉这一威胁，而他们并没有这样做。其次，毫无疑问，沙特阿拉伯公然违反了避免任意剥夺生命的消极义务。至于土耳其，如果它知道或应该知道在伊斯坦布尔的沙特领事馆内对卡舒吉的生命构成威胁，那么它有义务保护他的生命，如果那样的话，它就必须强行进入领事馆。挽救他生命的唯一方法。第三，Khashoggi 之死涉及调查他的死因的程序性积极义务。文章表明，土耳其做出的许多决定会损害调查的有效性，但土耳其声称为了尊重领事特权和豁免而必须采取这些决定，实际上领事法没有要求。例如，没有任何国际法规则要求土耳其允许沙特代理人离开该国，允许总领事和其他领事工作人员离开该国，或要求沙特阿拉伯同意搜查总领事。住所或领事馆的车辆。文章的结论是，无论是否完全实现了对卡舒吉遇害的责任，这并不能改变他的生命权受到国际法保护的事实，就像全世界无数其他专制政权受害者的生命权一样。这起谋杀侵犯了卡舒吉本人根据国际法享有的权利，而不仅仅是土耳其国家的权利。它值得用这些术语来讨论。