We examine board leadership structures in international joint ventures (IJVs) and investigate the determinants of CEO duality (i.e., the CEO also serves as chair). In contrast to corporate governance research emphasizing principal‐agent conflicts in corporations, we argue that duality in IJVs can impair the board's execution of its responsibilities when the chair reflects the interests of one of the partners. We consider how unique characteristics of IJVs as organizational forms can exacerbate such governance challenges. In addition, we investigate how formal and relational governance mechanisms supporting IJVs might mitigate these concerns and lead parent firms to adopt unified board leadership structures. By joining the IJV and corporate governance literatures, we identify some of the distinctive properties and determinants of this facet of IJV governance.

中文翻译：

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国际合资企业的董事会领导结构

我们研究了国际合资企业（IJV）中的董事会领导结构，并调查了CEO二重性的决定因素（即CEO也担任主席）。与强调公司中委托人与代理人之间的冲突的公司治理研究相反，我们认为，当董事长反映合伙人之一的利益时，合资企业的双重性会损害董事会履行其职责的能力。我们考虑合资企业作为组织形式的独特特征如何加剧这种治理挑战。此外，我们研究了支持合资企业的正式和关系治理机制如何减轻这些担忧并引导母公司采用统一的董事会领导结构。通过加入合资企业和公司治理文献，