ABSTRACT Antitrust law in Korea regulates internal transactions by the owner and his family, or ‘Person with Special Interest (PSI)’ of a large business group. Its regulatory grounds, however, are not well-established. This paper analyses internal transactions from the perspective of competition policy, particularly, exclusionary effects. Internal transactions between the upstream- and downstream-affiliates of a business group shrink the size of the upstream market and hence squeeze the profitability of potential entrants. Thus, it may exclude the entrants which, absent the transactions, would enter the market and contribute to consumers. In addition, it may lead to a breach of the fiduciary duty of PSI. We provide some policy implications by analysing the optimal behaviour of PSI.

中文翻译：

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大型企业集团内部交易的排他性影响

摘要 韩国的反垄断法规范了所有者及其家人或大型商业集团的“特殊利益人 (PSI)”的内部交易。然而，其监管依据并不完善。本文从竞争政策的角度分析内部交易，特别是排斥效应。企业集团上下游关联企业之间的内部交易会缩小上游市场的规模，从而挤压潜在进入者的盈利能力。因此，它可能排除那些在没有交易的情况下将进入市场并对消费者做出贡献的进入者。此外，这可能会导致违反 PSI 的受托责任。我们通过分析 PSI 的最佳行为来提供一些政策含义。