ABSTRACT We propose a theoretical model that economic growth rate is a strictly concave function of labour share: Growth rate increases with labour share and decreases after reaching the peak. If wage rates are determined through bargaining between labour unions and employers instead of competition in markets, the labour share deviates from the competitive equilibrium level. When this occurs, the economic growth rate is lower than that in the competitive equilibrium, and the growth rate decreases with the increasing labour share. Our empirical analyses of the 23 OECD countries’ balanced panel between 1980 and 2008 confirm our theoretical model.

中文翻译：

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经合组织国家的劳动力份额和经济增长

摘要 我们提出了一个理论模型，即经济增长率是劳动份额的严格凹函数：增长率随着劳动份额的增加而增加，达到峰值后下降。如果工资率是通过工会和雇主之间的谈判而不是市场竞争来确定的，那么劳动力份额就会偏离竞争均衡水平。当这种情况发生时，经济增长率低于竞争均衡时的增长率，增长率随着劳动份额的增加而下降。我们对 1980 年至 2008 年间 23 个经合组织国家的平衡面板的实证分析证实了我们的理论模型。