Preferences over social ranks have emerged as potential drivers of weaker than expected support for redistributive interventions among those closest to the bottom of the income distribution. We compare preferences for alterations of the income distribution affecting the decision maker’s social rank, but not their income, and compare them with similar alterations leaving both rank and income unchanged. Our study fails to find evidence of last-place aversion in a replication of Kuziemko et al. (Q J Econ 129(1):105–149, 2014). However, using a modified design that holds ranks fixed across rounds we find support for both a discontinuously greater disutility from occupying the last as opposed to higher ranks, thus affecting only those closest to the bottom of the distribution, and for a general dislike of rank reversals affecting most ranks. We discuss implications for policy design in both public finance and management science.

对社会等级的偏好已经成为最接近收入分配底部的人对再分配干预的支持弱于预期的潜在驱动因素。我们比较了对影响决策者社会等级但不影响其收入的收入分配变化的偏好，并将它们与保持等级和收入不变的类似变化进行比较。我们的研究未能在 Kuziemko 等人的复制中找到最后一位厌恶的证据。(QJ 经济学 129(1):105–149, 2014)。然而，使用修改后的设计，在各轮中保持固定的排名，我们发现占据最后一个而不是更高的排名的不连续更大的不利影响，因此只影响那些最接近分布底部的人，以及普遍不喜欢排名影响大多数等级的逆转。