Using a new biography of banks, we examine the stability of Irish banking from 1797 to 1826 by constructing a failure rate series. We find that the ultimate cause of the frequent and severe banking crises was the crisis-prone structure of the banking system, which was designed to benefit the political elite. There is little evidence to suggest that wildcat banking or the failure of the Bank of Ireland to act as a lender of last resort were to blame. We also find that the main economic effect of the episodic crises was major diminutions in the money supply.

中文翻译：

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野蛮的银行家还是政治失败？爱尔兰金融哑剧，1797–1826年

我们使用新的银行业传记，通过构建失败率序列，研究了1797年至1826年爱尔兰银行业的稳定性。我们发现，频繁而严峻的银行业危机的最终原因是银行体系易于发生危机的结构，其目的是使政治精英受益。几乎没有证据表明，怪异的银行业务或爱尔兰银行未能充当最后贷款人的行为应受到谴责。我们还发现，偶发性危机的主要经济影响是货币供应量的重大减少。