The advent of big data analytics has favoured the emergence of forms of price discrimination based on consumers’ profiles and their online behaviour (i.e. personalised pricing). The paper analyses this practice as a possible exploitative abuse by dominant online platforms. The paper argues that, in view of its “mixed” effect on consumers’ welfare, personalised pricing requires a case-by-case assessment under EU competition law and thus it should not be banned a priori. However, in view of the recent case law of the European Court of Justice on price discrimination, the National Competition Authorities (NCAs) and the European Commission would face a high burden of proof to sanction this conduct under Art. 102(c) TFEU. Finally, the paper argues that, due to its case-by-case approach, competition law seems more suitable than omnibus regulation to tackle the negative effects that personalised pricing could have on consumers’ welfare. In particular, an NCA/the European Commission could negotiate with online platforms different kinds of behavioural commitments: transparency requirements, limits on data collection/user profiling, rights to opt out of personalised pricing and the obligation to share customers’ data with competitors could significantly tame the risks of personalised pricing.

大数据分析的出现促进了基于消费者的个人资料及其在线行为（即个性化定价）的价格歧视形式的出现。本文将这种做法分析为主要的在线平台可能的剥削性滥用。该论文认为，鉴于个性化定价对消费者福利的“混合”影响，需要根据欧盟竞争法进行逐案评估，因此不应事先禁止它。但是，鉴于欧洲法院最近关于价格歧视的判例法，国家竞争局（NCA）和欧洲委员会将面临举证责任，以根据《艺术》制裁该行为。102（c）TFEU。最后，论文认为，由于采用了逐案方法，竞争法似乎比综合性法规，以解决个性化定价可能对消费者福利造成的负面影响。尤其是，NCA /欧盟委员会可以与在线平台协商不同种类的行为承诺：透明度要求，数据收集/用户配置的限制，选择退出个性化定价的权利以及与竞争对手共享客户数据的义务可能会很明显。驯服个性化定价的风险。