Real world contracts often contain incentive clauses that fail to fully specify conditions triggering payments, giving rise to legal disputes. When complete contract generate Pareto efficient allocations the L&E literature advocates that courts should fill in the missing clauses. This logic does not directly extend to environments with moral hazard, where complete contracts result in constrained efficient allocations. Despite this inefficiency we find that when agency and marginal agency costs are congruent, the legal system can do no better than guide its courts to complete contracts according to the parties’ intentions.

中文翻译：

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解释性合同：目的性方法和非综合性激励合同

现实世界中的合同通常包含激励条款，而这些条款未能完全指定触发付款的条件，从而引发法律纠纷。当完整的合同生成帕累托有效分配时，L＆E文献主张法院应填写缺失的条款。这种逻辑不会直接扩展到具有道德风险的环境，在这种环境中，完整的合同会导致有效分配受到约束。尽管效率低下，我们发现当代理费用和边际代理费用一致时，法律制度的作用无非就是指导其法院根据当事方的意图完成合同。