Given the lack of unambiguously constitutional foundations, Spain’s Constitutional Court (TC) has being playing a leading role in building the regulatory framework of the Autonomic State. This paper analyses whether this function is sufficient to explain the level of agreement among TC justices when adopting their resolutions, and in particular, on reaching unanimous rulings. If so, the legalist/federalist model would be a more adequate model to explain the behaviour of TC justices than the other models proposed in the literature on judicial behaviour: the attitudinal and the strategic models. A database has been constructed for this purpose with the 390 positive conflicts of competence between the central government and the autonomous communities resolved by the TC from 1981 to 2017, which have been used to estimate various explanatory models of unanimous rulings. The results obtained show the importance of the legalist/federalist model when attempting to explain unanimity in the Court’s pronouncements, but they also offer evidence that there are other factors that also influence the level of agreement among TC justices, remarkably the ideological ones.

中文翻译：

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西班牙宪法法院在解决权限冲突中的共识与异议：联邦制和意识形态的作用

鉴于缺乏明确的宪法基础，西班牙的宪法法院（TC）在建立自治州的监管框架中一直发挥着领导作用。本文分析了这项功能是否足以说明技术委员会大法官在通过其决议时，尤其是在达成一致裁定时的共识程度。如果是这样的话，与在司法行为方面的文献所提出的其他模型（态度和战略模型）相比，法学家/联邦制模型将是一个更充分的模型来解释技术合作法官的行为。为此，已经建立了一个数据库，其中包括TC在1981年至2017年间解决的390个中央政府与自治社区之间积极的能力冲突，用来估计各种一致裁定的解释模型。所获得的结果表明，在试图解释法院判决的一致意见时，法律家/联邦制模型的重要性，但它们也提供了证据，表明还有其他因素也影响了技术合作大法官之间的共识水平，特别是意识形态大法官。